Problems of Communism

NUMBER 2 MARCH–APRIL VOL. V 1956

PAGE

Commentary

Iconoclasm in Moscow 1

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Press and Censorship
How the Soviet Newspaper Operates,
by Leo Gruliow 3
Censorship in the USSR—A Documented Record,
by Merle Fainsod 12
The Shifting Line in Soviet Orientalogy,
by Walter Z. Laqueur 20

China

Trade Unions in Mao's China,
by H. Arthur Steiner 27

The Satellites

Albania: A Communist Colony,
by Daniel Norman 34

Book Reviews

The "Popular Front" Tactic in 1905
Leopold H. Haimson: *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism*,
Donald W. Treadgold: *Lenin and His Rivals*,
reviewed by Ronald Thompson 42
Economic Dilemma of a Soviet Satellite
Thad Paul Alton: *Polish Postwar Economy*,
reviewed by Alfred Zauberman 45

Notes and Views

Recent Studies on Communist Affairs 48
Correspondence 51

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Iconoclasm in Moscow

THE full implications of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which convened in Moscow February 14–25, will not be apparent for some weeks—perhaps months—to come. Yet there is little doubt, on the basis of information made public to date, that the Congress will go down in history as an event of signal importance.

The most spectacular development at the CPSU Congress was the virtual dethronement of the once omnipotent dictator of the USSR, Joseph Vissarionovitch Stalin, the foundation for which was provided by the address of the First Secretary of the party, Nikita Khrushchev. Speaking with the confidence that comes from a consciousness of power, Khrushchev startled his audience, and the world, by asserting that Communists—Leninist and Stalinist teachings notwithstanding—do not necessarily stand for the violent overthrow of the capitalist order; that parliaments (which, according to Lenin, were to be utilized for the express purpose of their eventual *destruction*) may serve as organs of "genuine democracy for the working people"; that "cooperation with social democrats" is "possible and essential"; and that the concept of "separate paths to socialism" was completely acceptable from the Marxist-Leninist point of view (thus in effect giving sanction to an erstwhile deviation for which many a dedicated Communist paid with his life).

The most significant statement, however, came toward the end of the speech. Said Khrushchev:

> The Central Committee adopted measures for wide-scale enlightenment on the Marxist-Leninist position of the role of personality in history. The Central Committee resolutely opposes the cult of personality alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, which turns one or another leader into a miracle-performing hero and, at the same time, minimizes the role of the party and the popular masses.

Though Khrushchev refrained from mentioning names, there was little doubt to whom he was referring: the "miracle-performing hero" was none other than the late dictator of the USSR, Joseph Stalin.

This theme was soon reiterated and expanded by other speakers. M. A. Suslov, Secretary of the C. P. S. U. Central Committee, bluntly condemned the "cult of personality . . . which was spread prior to the 19th Congress" (in 1952), and which "inflicted considerable damage both to organizational and ideological work of the party." And the veteran Bolshevik leader, Anastas Mikoyan, sharpened the edge of the attack by admitting that "in the course of about twenty years [!] we in fact had no collective leadership," and by denouncing "certain ossified forms of Soviet diplomacy" which had flourished until three years ago (a theme later developed by Molotov). He sharply attacked that holy of holies, the *Short Course on the History of the CPSU,* as well as other party histories (particularly those dealing with regions where Stalin had ostensibly played a prominent role in the early years of this century) for distortion of historical truth, and especially for their mendacious treatment of "certain" personalities. Finally, he criticized Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,* for its mistaken notions about the nature of contemporary capitalism.

The extent of this repudiation of the Stalin cult can only be fathomed by recalling the incredible lengths to which it was driven while the dictator was still alive. The "greatest genius on earth"; "great architect of communism"; "wise teacher and leader"; "inspirer of our glorious victories"; foremost authority on science, literature, linguistics, music—these are but a handful of the panegyrics showered upon him. What has caused this process to come to such an ignominious end?

AT the outset, it must be realized that the Soviet leadership is more than aware of the salutory effect that the liquidation of the Stalin cult will have on its subjects. The average man and woman, to whom Stalin meant—*inter alia*—privation, terror, purges, fear, and suspicion, cannot but welcome the repudiation as proof of good will on the part of the present regime, as an expression of its desire to break away from the bleak legacy which it had inherited in 1953. Viewed in this light, the latest step, marking the logical culmination point of a process which was initiated three years ago, can surely be considered one of the most astute tactics instituted by Stalin's successors.

But it is more than a tactic. The dethronement is indicative of a deep *malaise* with which all layers of Soviet society had been afflicted, and which the present leadership has found it imperative to terminate. Yet it would be probably incorrect to assume—as some commentators do—that the leadership has been faced with a crisis of major proportions. Indeed, despite the minor upheavals which have rocked the country since Stalin's death, the policies of his heirs have given every evidence of goal-consciousness, flexibility, and stability. The dethronement of Stalin may very well be taken as proof (though not conclusive, of course) that the Soviet regime does not find it necessary to *legitimize* its rule by relying on the myth of invincibility that the name of Stalin represented.

BEFORE the world accepts the *new* myth now being concocted in Moscow, a few words of caution seem to be in order.

First the dethronement of Stalin by no means and in no way can be equated with the restoration of democracy

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within the party or the country at large—if, indeed, one can at all speak of a democratic *restoration* in Soviet Russia. This is clearly demonstrated by the way in which the "cult of personality" is now being decried, as well as by the tenor of the Congress *in toto.* The new line is being handed down *from above*—this time, in particular, by Khrushchev—and the assembled delegates dutifully accept it, and dutifully go through the customary rites of officially sponsored enthusiasm ("animation in the hall"; "stormy and long applause, turning into ovation; all rise"; etc.). There is no disagreement from any quarter, no debate, nothing that even remotely resembles an honest exchange of opinion. On the contrary, the entire Congress bears the earmarks of the spurious spontaneity which Communist leaders love so well. As *Pravda* (Feb. 16) phrased it:

> The working people of the Soviet Union have been and are declaring their unanimous support for the domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party and for its general line . . . Everywhere, in towns and villages of our country, as factories and works, in pits and power stations . . . on collective farms, MTS, in scientific research establishments, and in army units, talks devoted to the 20th Party Congress are taking place . . . Everywhere the working people are expressing fervent approval . . ."

There is hardly a line here which does not resemble the hosannas sung at the 19th Congress, or any other important event in the history of the Soviet state.

Secondly, in deference to historical truth which Mikoyan has now rediscovered, it seems only fair to be reminded that the very people who are now attacking Stalin are the same ones who three years ago vied with each other in their extravagant tributes to him. It was only in October 1952, at the 19th Congress, that Mikoyan stated:

> At the present stage in world history and the history of our motherland, it is unthinkable to live, build, fight without thorough mastery of all the new concepts Comrade Stalin has contributed to the Marxist-Leninist science . . . After the 19th Party Congress our party will go forward still more calmly and confidently to the victory of communism, under the guidance of our leader and teacher, the brilliant architect of communism, our own beloved Comrade Stalin. Glory to the great Stalin!" (Stormy, prolonged applause. All rise.)—*Pravda*, Oct. 12, 1952.

Those who are now burying Stalin are those who brought him to power, who—though exposed to Stalin's paranoiac wrath—were also the beneficiaries of his exalted status—in short, those who had, in the course of the past quarter of a century, taken the place of the men who made the revolution and then fell victim to it. Their present protestations, therefore, cannot but have a hollow ring of insincerity.

In his speech, Mikoyan resurrected two Bolshevik figures who had disappeared during the Great Purge in the 1930's: Antonov-Ovseenko and Kossior. Yet are we to expect any further and more fundamental rehabilitations of erstwhile idols turned into "non-persons?" It is sufficient to read Khrushchev's denunciation of "Trotskyites, Bukharinites, bourgeois nationalists and other enemies of the people" (that is, people who were actually brought to trial and did not merely vanish as those mentioned by Mikoyan) to realize how far the party is from renouncing its favorite bogey men and from cleansing its historical record. Furthermore, the party can hardly be expected to give up the instrument of the purge—even though its form may be radically altered. It is a truism worth repeating that a society that knows of no orderly procedure of governmental change must resort to the purge in its effort to keep the machinery of the state from stagnating. And a party which claims to be infallible in its *essential* ideological premises—and *at any given time*—must perforce resort to scapegoats to explain its past failings, mistakes, and shortcomings.

By using the term "scapegoats" we may, perhaps, arrive at the crux of the matter, not only insofar as the Stalin myth is concerned, but also as regards the Communist system at large. The country is suffering from famine? It is the fault of the *kulaks.* The economy of the state is on the verge of collapse? It is the sabotage of the Mensheviks, the Trotskyites, the Bukharinites, the Zinovievites. Bureaucratic inefficiency? It is not the system that is at fault—it is the slovenly, corrupt, and incorrigible small-fry functionaries and officials. And so on and on, *ad infinitum.*

Since Stalin's death, Beria has been the chief culprit—the man responsible for all and sundry calamities—for fomenting hatred between nationalities, for depriving the Soviet citizen of his legal rights, for rupturing relations with Yugoslavia and for the deterioration of relations with Turkey, for unjustly dissolving the Polish CP in 1938, for despoiling Marxism-Leninism. Now, perhaps, we see the beginning of the most horrendous, the most ironic jest ever perpetrated in the annals of the Soviet State: Stalin, until recently the "glorious sun" of the USSR, is becoming its *bête noire.* The Soviet people may indeed breathe more easily now that the leadership is telling them that an oppressive chapter is over, and that a new era is dawning. But can they be sure? Can they have confidence in the promises of their leaders? Strange things have happened at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, but who knows what stranger things will happen during the next few years, before a new Congress is convened? Today Khrushchev is burying Stalin—who, one is tempted to wonder, will bury Khrushchev?

A. B.

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The Soviet Press and Censorship

Editors' Note: On the eve of "Soviet Press Day," held every year on the 5th of May, *Problems of Communism* presents two articles which throw some light on the operation, structure and behind-the-scenes workings of communism's mightiest and most pervasive propaganda weapon. In the first article, Mr. Leo Gruliow analyzes the *modus operandi* of Soviet newspapers within the matrix of Communist Party control, discussing such matters as content, coverage, style, newspaper organization and administration. The second article, by Professor Merle Fainsod of Harvard, concentrates on the Soviet censorship apparatus, which exists as a separate, supervising arm over the press. The author's revelations are based on a documentary source of unimpeachable authenticity—the much-publicized Smolensk Archive, a collection of Soviet official papers captured by the Nazis during World War II and later turned over to American authorities. Our readers may be interested to know that this Archive has now been made available to the general public for research study; the original documents repose in the Army Records Center at Alexandria, Virginia.

How the Soviet Newspaper Operates

By LEO GRULIOW

MAY 5, 1912, is the great landmark in the history of the Soviet press. On that day *Pravda* (Truth), central organ of the Bolsheviks and progenitor of the Soviet press, made its appearance in St. Petersburg. Among the founding editors were Lenin, Stalin and Molotov.

Pravda's birthday is now celebrated throughout the Soviet Union as Press Day, and each year on May 5 one encounters in every Soviet newspaper and magazine a phrase from Lenin summing up the press as "not only collective propagandist and collective agitator, but collective organizer."[1]

This narrow view of the newspaper has been enshrined as the credo of Soviet journalism. The press is propagandist, agitator, and organizer, to the virtual exclusion of other functions—including the duty of conveying information. It exists to serve the party and the state, as Soviet newspapers themselves never tire of proclaiming on each Press Day. The title of a 1955 Press Day article by M. Strepukhov, Vice-chairman of the Communist Party Central Committee's Propaganda and Agitation Department, constitutes an apt Soviet definition of the press: "Powerful Instrument for Mobilizing the Masses to Carry Out Party and Government Decisions." [2]

Control of this instrument is vested directly in the party hierarchy. A majority of Soviet newspapers are official organs of the Communist Party. The editors of these papers are appointed by the executive party body of the area served by the newspaper and often are themselves members of the party executive. CP control of the selection of editors also extends to newspapers which are not party organs. The appointment, removal or promotion of every editor in the country must have the approval of the executive party body of the respective area. In addition, to ensure control by the top echelons within the party, the choice of editor in every case must be confirmed by an executive party body higher in the territorial-administrative scale. Appointments of editors of local papers must be confirmed by province and republic party committees; appointments of editors of province and republic newspapers must be confirmed by the Central Committee itself.[3]

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Works* (4th Russian ed), Vol. V, p. 10.

Leo Gruliow, an American journalist, worked five years as a newsman in the Soviet Union during the 1930's. He returned to that country, 1943–45, as the representative of Russian War Relief. He has edited *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, New York, since it began publication in 1949 and is editor of the book *Current Soviet Policies* (Praeger, New York, 1953).

[2] M. Strepukhov in *Kommunist*, organ of the CPSU Central Committee, No. 6, April 1955, pp. 91–102.

[3] For a description of party control of the appointment of editors, see Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, A Study in Mass Persuasion*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1950.

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How Many Daily Readers?

THE press which the party hierarchy thus controls is obviously a substantial force, but Soviet sources have exhibited a vagueness concerning its dimensions. Figures cited in recent years range from "more than 7,000" to "more than 8,000" newspapers, and the total circulation mentioned varies from 43,000,000 to 47,000,000.[4] Such data provide no breakdowns as to periodicity; they lump together daily, thrice-weekly, twice-weekly, and weekly papers, and give the combined circulation as "circulation per issue." A recent visitor to the USSR, however, was informed by Nikolai G. Palgunov, director of the Tass news agency (the Soviet state's single news service), that among the "more than 7,000" Soviet newspapers "approximately 500" are dailies.[5] There is no way to establish a further break-down since many of the Soviet papers are forbidden to circulate outside the country.[6]

However vague such figures, they clearly indicate that the USSR is not a country of wide newspaper distribution. By comparison the United States, which ranks only seventh in the world in daily newspaper circulation per capita, and which has a considerably smaller population than the Soviet Union, has 1,760 dailies. The combined circulation of the American dailies is now 56,147,359 (55,072,480 in 1955), compared with 43–47,000,000 for all Soviet papers. In addition, there were 8,428 weekly newspapers in the United States last year, with a combined circulation of 17,396,936.[7]

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[4] A Tass story in *Pravda* (May 5, 1953, p. 1) cited the number of papers as 8,300. More recently, an article on the press in the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* (2nd ed., Vol. 32, Moscow, 1955, p. 636) claims there are "about 7,000" papers and "more than 47 million" circulation per issue. William Benton, publisher of *Encyclopedia Britannica*, who visited the USSR in November 1955, was told by Nikolai G. Palgunov, Tass director, that there are today "more than 7,000 papers" with a total circulation of 43–47 million. Konstantin Gubin, editor of *Izvestia* told Mr. Benton on the other hand that there were "about 8,000" papers (see "Benton Bares Soviet Press System," *Editor & Publisher*, New York, December 17, 1955).

[5] From William Benton's notes of his various interviews with Palgunov, Gubin and Yuri Zhukov, foreign editor of *Pravda* (see footnote 4).

[6] Since 1954 most of the "central" and republic-level papers have been allowed to accept foreign subscriptions, but newspapers below the rank of republic organs cannot be distributed freely outside the immediate areas they serve. Presumably this is out of considerations of censorship.

[7] "US Dailies Top 56 Million Circulation for First Time," *Editor & Publisher*, New York, January 28, 1956. See also *Editor & Publisher International Year Book*, 36th edition, New York, 1956, containing data for 1955.

Who the Publishers Are

EVEN were the newspaper supply adequate, the circulation of a Soviet paper would not depend upon the readers' choice among competing publications. The allocation of newsprint sets a ceiling on the circulation of the paper. (In view of the present insufficient newsprint supply, this ceiling almost automatically becomes the circulation.) And newsprint, along with other publishing facilities, is assigned by the party and government according to the rank of the organization publishing the newspaper and the relative importance of the paper in the light of the current party program.

Soviet newspapers are published by the organizations which administer various aspects of Soviet life—the party, the Soviets (local government organs), the trade unions, the Young Communist League, the army, navy and air force, the ministries of various industries, of transport, agriculture, culture and so on, plus a small number of specialized bodies such as the Writers' Union or the Public Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces. Each paper concentrates on the particular sphere defined by the special interests of the publishing organization and its territorial scope, and within this sphere faces no competition. The specialized (industrial, agricultural, *etc.*) papers, at least among the dailies and thrice-weeklies, are also newspapers of general news. A reason may be the newsprint shortage.

Regardless of the papers' specialization, it is again at the party offices that decisions are made concerning the rise, fall and relative prominence of the various papers in accordance with the tasks of the moment. During the First Five-Year Plan, when the party leaders placed industrial development at the top of the country's agenda, the now-forgotten *Ekonomicheskaia zhizn* (Economic Life) and *Za industrializatsiu* (For Industrialization) were given wide circulation. *Krestianskaia gazeta* (Peasants' Gazette), which sold 300,000 copies, was simply discontinued in the spring of 1939, when it was judged that the peasants had been sufficiently collectivized. When World War II broke out, *Krasnaia zvezda* (Red Star), the army newspaper, was granted a big lead in circulation and facilities. Since the recent decisions to develop farming, *Selskoye khozyaistvo* (Agriculture), a relatively new paper, has been granted the newsprint to enlarge its circulation to 1,000,000, placing it among the top five.

The prominence of the individual newspaper is thus determined in large measure by its temporary functional importance. But there is also a basic, little-changing hierarchy among the newspapers, as among

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STRONG MEASURES

—Inform the editor immediately that the facts have been confirmed and the culprit removed from his job! But you needn't say that he has been assigned to another position, with a raise.

—From *Krokodil*, Moscow, January 10, 1953.

their publishing organizations. The party, the government, the unions and the Young Communist League retain a consistent top status—ranking in roughly this order—regardless of ups and downs in the temporary importance of agricultural administrations, military or cultural agencies, or various industries; and their newspapers rank accordingly.

Uniformity and Diversity

PERHAPS the outstanding feature of all the papers is the uniformity enforced upon them, despite the diversity of the spheres with which they deal. In the franker atmosphere since Stalin's death, Strepukhov admits and criticizes this, although he carefully avoids touching on the reason:

Before me lie several issues of province and territory newspapers published on the same day. Above all, one is arrested by the papers' striking similarity. Like twins, they can hardly be distinguished from one another. If it were not for the masthead . . . any one of the newspapers could be substituted for another, and neither the reader nor the staff itself would notice.

Citing editorials on agricultural problems as an example, he writes:

The approach of all the newspapers to the subject is the same. As a rule they speak first of the importance of the current agricultural campaign. The outstanding collective farms and districts are mentioned. Then comes the invariable "However": "However, far from everywhere is genuine concern shown . . ."—and several unfavorable examples are cited. The conclusion follows: "Such a situation is intolerable." At the end a directive is laid down: "Party and Soviet organizations must—," "Collective farm managers are required—." Unfortunately, these faults mark not only local but many central newspapers.[8]

There are nevertheless marked differences in tone, if not in substance, among papers. At one end of the spectrum stands the chief party organ *Pravda*, solemn, sober and omnipotent. At the other end the country's four or five evening papers, such as Moscow's popular *Vechernaia Moskva*—newsy, sprightly, and regarded as lightweight.[9]

Komsomolskaia Pravda (Young Communist League organ), aimed at a young audience, has the liveliest make-up in the country and is written in brighter, simpler style than most Soviet dailies. It deals particularly with relations between the sexes, student ethics, morality and errant youth—recently it sparked a movement to organize youth brigades to help the militia (police) to deal with ruffians and "hooligans"—and its favorite devices are letters describing the misdeeds or plight of a young person followed by readers' discussions of the problems presented.

Literaturnaia gazeta (Literary Gazette), the thrice-weekly paper of the Writers' Union, is also distinctive. It deals with many areas besides the literary, and caters to intellectuals. The *Lit. gazeta* became perhaps the only Soviet newspaper to question an Official policy since the 1920's by conducting a running campaign from 1950 to 1954 against the continued segregation of boys and girls in separate schools in the large cities. This policy had been in effect for some 10 years and was already being dropped piecemeal in city after city, for practical reasons, before the *Lit. gazeta* was emboldened to take up the cudgels for its complete abandonment. Segregation of pupils by sexes was finally ended in 1954.

When *Pravda* speaks, however, *Lit. gazeta*, along with all other Soviet papers, hastens to agree, for *Pravda* is the voice of the top party leadership. The

[8] Strepukhov, *op. cit.*

[9] A. Kotlyar, a newspaperman in the Ukraine until 1936, declares that the evening newspaper has been a concession by the party to the public and that evening papers were frequently attacked by party "ascetics." See his *Newspapers in the USSR—Recollections and Observations of a Soviet Journalist*, translated by Fred Holling, mimeographed, Research Program on the USSR, New York, 1955, pp. 20–21.

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Lit. gazeta, for instance, praised Vera Panova's *The Seasons*, a novel published in 1954 which was unusual in the extent to which it subtly criticized certain aspects of Soviet society. But when *Pravda* inveighed against this book, *Lit. gazeta* turned around and denounced both the book and its own previous review.[10] Similarly, in 1954 *Komsomolskaia Pravda* printed a letter from readers supporting the young critic V. Pomerantsev in his impassioned demand for sincerity in Soviet literature, but quickly apologized for this "grave error" after *Pravda* attacked Pomerantsev.[11] Only once in recent years has a Soviet newspaper talked back to *Pravda*. On December 9, 1955, a *Pravda* editorial ridiculed a line from an *Izvestia* article on corn growing; next day *Izvestia* printed a rejoinder, complaining that *Pravda* had taken the quote out of context.[12]

Pravda is the only paper in the country published seven days a week. It has a circulation of 4,900,000, a lead of 3,500,000 over its nearest competitor, the main government organ *Izvestia*.[13] These two alone among Soviet papers maintain foreign correspondents; but *Pravda* has 25, *Izvestia* only eight. The editorial and major articles from *Pravda* are read over the radio each day, and many of its editorials and articles are reprinted by local papers in lieu of their own.

[10] See Jeri Laber, "The Soviet Writer's Search for New Values," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. V, No. 1, January–February 1956, p. 18.

[11] *Komsomolskaia Pravda* of March 17, p. 3 and June 6, p. 2. The attack in *Pravda*, by A. Surkov, appeared May 25, pp. 2–3.

[12] Editorial, "What the Results of Corn Growing Reveal," *Pravda*, December 9, 1955, p. 1; "A Rejoinder," *Izvestia*, December 10, p. 3.

[13] Benton's notes of his interview with Gubin (see footnote 5).

From the Soviet Press: How To Write

The following commentary is excerpted from "The Feature Writers' 'Handbook'," by Natalia Ilina in Literaturnaia Gazeta, October 22, 1955, p 3:

We offer you a guide which will help you to write newspaper features without going anywhere and with only report figures for a district or even for a single collective farm. We shall try to enumerate the most common methods of turning report figures into a work of art for a newspaper.

You should begin this way: "The train slowed down, its couplings squealing. We got out onto the platform. There was a trail of smoke from somewhere. 'Are you going to Dawn Collective Farm)' asked a stocky man, twisting his hat in his hands. A minute later a fat horse, briskly swinging its combed tial, was pulling us along a narrow road traversing the fields. Shoots of buckwheat, millet, wheat, oats, corn and potatoes (delete those which do not apply) showed green here and there. There was a look of abundance everywhere."

Now is the time to interpolate the report figures. We suggest the following presentations:

Variant No. 1: Presenting the Report through the Driver

As we were saying: "There was a look of abundance everywhere . . .

"'Giddyap, Malyutka, step lively!' shouted the driver, then turned his old, weather-beaten face, with eyes that shone youthfully under thick eyebrows. 'This the first time you've been in these parts?'

"'The first time,' I answered, unbuttoning my collar.

"'It's a good life,' the driver said in a husky voice, and pointed his whip-handle at a power line. 'See that? Electricity everywhere. We have a radio center, a club, a library. Many people have bought radios, electric stoves, electric irons, television sets, refrigerators. Everybody at the farm gets good pay for his work.'

"'Is that so?' I said, sheltering my face in my collar.

"'Of course,' he continued, drawing on his *makhorka* [lowgrade tobacco] cigarette. 'Poultry farming alone gives us an income of a hundred thousand. Come on, Malyutka! The square-cluster method of planting potatoes greatly increases the advantages of growing them. And animal husbandry ——'

"We entered a pine forest. Malyutka ran fast through the beautiful trees.

"'As I was saying, animal husbandry ——. Kozlov, our leading shepherd, gets an average of 141.2 lambs every year from his flock of coarse-wooled sheep. Ah, life is good! Giddyap, Malyutka!'

"The collective farm buildings appeared in the distance. Toying with the buttons on his jacket, the driver said, 'See that red roof? The dairy farm. In just the last two years dairy maid Sitnikova has obtained more than one and a half million centners—no, I mean kilograms—of milk from the cows in her charge. That's how things are around here.'

"The driver's eyes kindled."

(We won't continue. This variant is obvious. You ride and ride until the driver has unbosomed himself of everything you have to tell the reader.)

Variant No. 2: Presenting the Report through a Meeting of Collective Farmers

As we were saying, "There was a look of abundance everywhere." Continue: "It was dark by the time we got to Dawn Collective Farm. The club was crowded even though it was late. A meeting was in progress.

"'I ask for the floor!' said a deep, pleasant voice, and a woman with a friendly face and clear gray eyes walked to the front.

"'Our best dairy maid, Masha Sitnikova,' whispered my neighbor, a girl with fluffy locks of hair which peeped from under her kerchief. 'A leading worker! During the last two years she got more than one and a half million kilograms of milk from her cows. We love her!'

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"Organized" News

Only one Soviet newspaper organization can compete with *Pravda* in scope (though not in rank). This is Tass, the monopoly news agency. In addition to its news service, Tass operates a photo service, a mat and plastic cut service (Pressklishe), a radio news service, a feature syndicate (Pressburo) and a confidential news service distributed under seal to metropolitan editors and high officials of state and party.[14]

The Tass view of news is as sharp and simple as Lenin's definition of the press, and very similar. In the 1920's some Soviet newspapermen and journalism instructors divided news into "factographic" (informational) news and "active" or "creative" (propaganda-serving). In lectures to journalism students at Moscow University, Tass director Palgunov completely denied the existence of "factographic" news, asserting (with his own italics):

> **News must be *organized;* else it is news of *mere events* and *happenstance.* . . . News must not merely throw light on this or that fact or event—*it must pursue a definite purpose.* . . . News is agitation via facts. In selecting the news subject, the author of the news report must proceed above all from the realization that not all facts and not just any events should be reported in the press. . . . *News must be didactic and instructive.*[15]**

[14] From Benton's notes of an interview with Palgunov; also from Palgunov's *Fundamentals of News in the Newspaper—Tass and Its Role* (in Russian), lectures at the School of Journalism, Moscow University, Moscow University Publishing House, Moscow, 1955.

[15] Palgunov, *ibid.*, p. 34.

. . . (*Or Not To Write*) *on Order*

"Sitnikova spoke excitedly, pushing a lock of blond hair from her forehead (variant: twisting the ends of her fluffy kerchief). 'I want to say that the people at our collective farm are good and hard-working. Poultry farming alone gives us an income of a hundred thousand. And what about potatoes? The square-cluster method of planting increases the advantages of cultivating them.'

" 'Right!' voices cried approvingly.

"The dairy maid was followed by an old man with a weatherbeaten face and eyes that shone youthfully under thick eyebrows.

" 'Kozlov, our best shepherd,' whispered my neighbor on the left, a young man with a mischievous grin, a curly forelock and a zippered jacket. 'A leading worker! He's managed to get 141.2 lambs from his flock of coarse-wooled sheep.'

"Kozlov spoke excitedly, twisting his hat in his hands (variant: toying with the buttons on his jacket). 'I want to say that what Masha Sitnikova said about the square-cluster method is right. We've acted on this and now we're growing 180 to 200 centners per hectare.'

"I remained behind with the chairman as the collective farmers, walking with the firm steps of those who are in their own home, slowly dispersed.

" 'We live well,' said the chairman, drawing on his *makhorka* cigarette and screwing up his shrewd, twinkling eyes. 'We have a radio center, a club, a library. Many people have bought electric stoves, radios, electric irons, television sets, refrigerators.'

"The chairman's eyes kindled."

Variant No. 3: Presenting the Report through Interviews with Leading Workers.

As we were saying, "There was a look of abundance everywhere.

"We found dairy maid Sitnikova as she was taking the daily 90 liters (4 percent fat content) from the cow Zorka.

" 'Marya Savvishna, tell us how you obtained record milk yields.'

" 'The people here are good and hard-working,' the dairy maid said excitedly, pushing a lock of blond hair from her forehead (variant: twisting the ends of her kerchief). 'We're growing rich. Poultry farming alone gives the collective farm an income of a hundred thousand. There is abundance everywhere. We have a radio center, a club, a library. Many people have bought radios, electric stoves, electric irons. It makes you want to roll up your sleeves and milk, milk, milk!' added Sitnikova, her eyes kindling.

"We found shepherd Peter Kozlov as his flock of coarse-wooled sheep was giving birth to another 141.2 lambs.

" 'How did I achieve this?' Peter Ivanovich repeated our question. 'Have a seat and I'll tell you.'

"Drawing on his *makhorka* cigarette and toying with the buttons on his jacket, the shepherd said, 'The square-cluster method is increasing . . . ,' etc.

(This is a good variant because it allows for changes of scene. We also advise you to introduce a love scene as this revives interest.)

"We found tractor-driver Fedya, a curly-headed youth with a mischievous grin, as tractor-trailer operator Katya was decorating her beloved's cap with snowdrops, camomiles, cornflowers (delete those which do not apply). A mischievous breeze was playing with the girl's fluffy hair.

" 'The Machine and Tractor Station is a growing material, technical and scientific base for agricultural development,' said Fedya, toying with the zipper on his jacket. 'And it is also an organizing force——'

" 'Of agricultural production,' Katya added, her slender fingers toying with the camomiles (snowdrops).

"The forest looked blue in the distance. Owls hooted. The last rays of the setting sun . . . ," etc.

* * *

The saddest and funniest thing about our "handbook" is that many of its points and even sentences are taken from accounts which have appeared in the press.

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Tass follows Palgunov's advice that "not all facts" should be reported. Side by side with its regular outgoing daily file for Soviet papers, it operates its confidential news service for top officials and editorial people. News deemed unfit for publication is relegated to this file. Thus, whenever there has been a major Soviet statement, for example, Tass rounds up foreign comment; if the comment is unfavorable, Tass releases for publication such innocuous reactions as "All London newspapers print the Soviet declaration under large headlines on page one" and then assigns to the confidential service the unfavorable editorial comments. Or it releases an item that "many French papers indulge in gross fabrications, slander and distortion of the Soviet declaration," and saves the substance of the adverse reaction for the confidential service. The latter device has been an almost invariable rule in the Tass reporting of UN debates. The Soviet delegate's remarks are reported *in extenso*, the replies by foreign delegates disposed of in a phrase such as "several delegates crudely attacked the Soviet position"—without mentioning what they said. What they said goes into the "not for publication" service.

A tremendous part of Tass reporting of international affairs consists of quotation of newspaper opinion, very often from foreign Communist or sympathetic news organs. This enables the official Soviet press to present views which might be undiplomatic for it to express in its own name, and also adds the prestige of the foreign source to the Soviet argument. Anyone interested in the curious consequences of this practice could study the speeches of the late A. Y. Vyshinsky, abounding in quotations from the world press, and the columns of *Pravda*, in which many of these quotations appeared under Tass datelines. The same lines quoted from a foreign paper would then appear a second time in *Pravda* in the text of Vyshinsky's speeches. Tass is the feeder agency for such quotations.

A strange instance of the interplay of Tass censorship of foreign news and of *Pravda*'s unique position among Soviet papers occurred in December 1950, during the Korean war. On December 2, all Soviet papers including *Pravda*, printed a Tass account of American press reactions to the setback in Korea at that time.[16] The next day *Pravda* reprinted its Tass account of the day before, almost word for word, under the by-line of its foreign affairs commentator "Observer," with the addition of numerous paragraphs and sentences which had not appeared in the first day's version.[17] These included the first mention that America was concerned not merely by the Korean war but by "the problem of world communism centering in Russia" and that the United States might be interested in a diplomatic settlement in Korea. Since the political line had been to avoid any hint that the USSR was concerned in Korea and to present America as bent on world war, Tass had no authority to release such statements from the American press. But *Pravda*, with its direct access to the Kremlin, apparently obtained authorization or instructions to reinstate such quotations from American papers in the story, even at the expense of printing it over again.

The "Operative" Staff and the "Instructors"

THE Tass domestic news service is divided into departments on functional lines: party news, Soviet news, industry and transport, agriculture, culture, military and sports, youth, *etc.* The individual newspaper staff is constructed on similar lines. Each of these departments or desks of the paper has a so-called "operative" staff of writers and reporters and a staff of "instructors."

The professional journalists of the "operative" writing staff are picked for their literary ability, and often are not party members—even on the party paper *Pravda*. The "instructors," however, are usually party men. Their function is to "make news" by organizing meetings and discussions at factories, clubs, *etc.*, and to obtain statements from rank-and-file individuals carefully selected to "represent the public" by their comments on a current topic or campaign ordered from above.

Arkady Gaev, formerly a member of the *Pravda* and *Izvestia* staffs, has described how the "instructors" organize public opinion around such a campaign, using as an example a drive for more efficient collective agriculture.[18] A staff "instructor" is assigned to describe the weaknesses of work organization on collective farms, paying particular attention to "dwarf" collectives. He seeks out small farms which operate badly, and describes them; then he obtains letters or organizes a meeting, which he reports, criticizing the smallness of the farms. Several months later, when the campaign has had sufficient build-up, comes a decree merging small farms, and perhaps eventually extensive merging of the larger farms. Gaev reported that the "letters to Stalin" pledging higher

[16] "American Press on Reaction in the USA to Events in Korea," Tass, in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, December 2, 1950, p. 4.

[17] Observer, "American Press on Defeat of American Troops in Korea," *Pravda*, December 3, 1950, p. 4.

[18] A. Gaev, "Kak delayetsya 'Pravda'" (How *Truth* is Made), *Vestnik* (Bulletin), Institute for Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Munich, No. 4, 1953, pp. 87–96.

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Label on Bottle: **Criticism.**

Prescription: **For idling, gossiping, complacency, conceit, deception, bureaucracy and other dangerous diseases.**

Caption below: **The medicine is bitter, but indispensable for health.**

—From *Krokodil*, March 27, 1953.

industrial and farm output used to be written in the *Pravda* offices. Then "instructors" would be sent to an appropriate farm or shop for launching the current campaign to boost output. These men, after contacting local executives, would organize meetings and conferences, setting up speakers to submit an open letter for signature.

Before the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952 the Soviet press ran a campaign against corruption and graft. The campaign was not of the public-meeting order but was waged through articles and sketches exposing grafters and embezzlers. A large percentage of Jewish names appeared among the accused. Newspaper editorials chimed in with the cry, "Down with the Khains and Yaroshetskys!" (two men shot for speculation). When the "Jewish doctors' plot" was proclaimed by the Soviet press, the newspapers broke into a spate of peculiar articles.[19] Starting out with references to "foreign plots" and to the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia, these articles called for "vigilance" against enemies of the state; then suddenly the line switched to "vigilance" against corruption! This formula was followed rigidly throughout the country, clearly indicating an organized campaign directed from the Kremlin. What part the newspaper "instructors" played, outside of helping to set up indignation meetings which were reported in the press, cannot be determined, of course.

After the purge of Beria, a number of public prosecutors—who had been quoted at length concerning the need for "vigilance" during the period of the "doctors' plot"—turned up among newspaper contributors in a campaign of articles promising law observance and protection of the rights of the individual. The change in this instance was a healthy one; but a press system which can be so readily manipulated for one campaign and then reversed can be turned around again just as easily. The style of the more political campaigns may be gauged from the following epithets, culled from *Izvestia* of July 14, 1953, describing Beria—without presentation of evidence—as "enemy of the party and the people," "foul degenerate," "vile agent of international imperialism," "traitor and adventurer," "hireling of foreign capital," "cunning and evil enemy" and so on.

Since the death of Stalin and the purge of Beria, Soviet editorial campaigns have focused on such targets as juvenile delinquency, crime, wasteful construction, inefficiency and particularly overstaffing in industry. These campaigns have been waged largely by the editorial staffs proper, without the fanfare of the set-up meeting, which is now used largely to support and advertise Soviet moves in the international arena, such as the recent letters from Bulganin to President Eisenhower.

Planning a Newspaper a Month Ahead

THE head of each department or desk of the Soviet newspaper draws up a plan listing the themes of articles and news stories which are to be carried for a month ahead. This is not just a "futures book". In drawing up monthly plans the editors are guided by the lists of slogans issued twice yearly—on May Day and on the anniversary of the October revolution; by the topics raised in the speeches of party and government leaders; by the lists of topics recommended each fortnight in the party-issued "agitators' handbooks"; and by direct briefing at party offices. Anniversaries and holidays are prominent in the plans of topics to be covered. The newspapers build issues, sometimes for several days in succession, around May Day, the anniversary of the revolution, Lenin's birthday, Army Day, Navy Day, *etc.* When

[19] See the author's introduction to *Current Soviet Policies* and examples of the campaign articles in that book. See also *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. V, No. 4, March 7, 1953.

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the party line calls for a particular current emphasis, an anniversary is used as a peg: several times during the cold war, Maxim Gorky's birthday has been the occasion for reprinting his caustic comments on America. The date of such writings is ignored. On Press Day, 1953, *Literaturnaia gazeta* cited Dickens' "Pickwick Papers," as well as passages from Mark Twain, Balzac and Maupassant to depict the "venal," "unprincipled," "shameless," "sensation-hunting" press of other countries, just as though the Eatanswill Gazette of a century ago represented the British press of today.[20]

Sometimes the monthly editorial plan undergoes an unexpected change, as when the party's propaganda and agitation department instructs editors to open up a new topic, hitherto banned or treated differently. For example, news of the destructiveness of atomic bombs, withheld for eight years, was disclosed in a flood of newspaper coverage in 1954.[21] India's independence, previously treated with mockery, became a focal point for news and articles in 1955.[22]

The editor coordinates the monthly plans drawn up by the various departments and submits them to the party officialdom for confirmation.[23] Then the department heads assign the topics to their staff writers and "instructors." Usually the writers are given what may seem a long time to prepare a story, two weeks or more. One reason is that the copy must undergo a great deal of checking. The writer must check not only his facts, but the standing of all persons concerned in his story.[24]

It may seem strange that a newspaper, presumably dedicated to presenting the latest news, should be able to plan its contents by the month. But Palgunov's definition of news must be remembered. Speed of coverage is not considered its most essential element. Competition in speed of presentation is not encouraged. Occasionally *Pravda* may disclose a story before other papers, but they find nothing embarrassing in reprinting the *Pravda* account a day late.

The monopoly control of the press makes it possible for the authorities to hold up a story at will and to release it on any date deemed suitable. For five days, January 29–February 3, 1956, the entire Soviet press held up President Eisenhower's reply to Bulganin on the latter's proposal of a US–USSR pact, although the world press was filled with the news. During those five days the Soviet papers conducted an "instructors" campaign in support of the Bulganin proposal and carefully edited comment from abroad so that it would make sense alike to those who knew of the President's reply and the public at large, which did not know of it. Then, when the Soviet counter-reply was ready, the Soviet press released the five-day-old story.

[20] "The Voice of Truth," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, May 5, 1953, p. 1.

[21] See the author's "What the Russians are Told," *The Reporter*, New York, March 24, 1955, pp. 15-20.

[22] See W. Z. Laqueur's article in this issue; also the editorial, "As Moscow Sees It," *The Hindu*, Madras, July 10, 1952.

[23] See editorial, "The Soviet Journalist," *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 9, May 1955, pp. 3–9, for references to this procedure.

[24] Gaev, *op. cit.*

A "Court of Appeals" for Readers

ALONG with its function of reportage, Soviet newspapers are charged with the task of being eyes and ears for the party. In effect, they act as an investigating arm of the regime in every sphere of Soviet life, keeping tabs on production problems, party members' indoctrination and agitational work, the concerns of students, the activities of clubs and sports circles, and so on.

In this work they draw on the public as informers, devoting a substantial section of their issues to letters of complaint about everyday life and work. Such letters are encouraged as part of the Soviet process of "self-criticism," consisting, according to the Ushakov dictionary of the Russian language, of "public criticism of the work defects of one's own enterprise or organization and of the activity and conduct of individual workmen."[25] The papers maintain a large staff to deal with the letters of complaint—larger, usually, than the editorial staff.

There are, however, strict limitations upon the scope and nature of allowable complaints, as Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger of Harvard University have shown in an analysis of a wide sampling of published letters.[26] Never do the letters touch on matters of domestic or foreign political controversy or on basic policies and actions of the regime; their criticisms deal exclusively with the routine matters of everyday life. There are complaints of irregular autobus schedules, lack of playground space for children, bad service and poor food in restaurants, the unsatisfactory quality and shortages of specific consumer goods, *etc.* Letters dealing with production complain chiefly of the poor supply of materials and equipment, unsatisfactory maintenance and utilization of tractors and machinery, and the like.

[25] D. N. Ushakov, *Tolkovy slovar russkovo yazyka* (Interpretive Dictionary of the Russian Language), Moscow, 1940, Vol. IV, p. 37, quoted by Inkeles and Geiger, "Critical Letters to the Editors of the Soviet Press: in two parts, *Sociological Review*, Vol. 17, No. 6, December 1952, pp. 694–703; and Vol. 18, No. 1, February 1953, pp. 12–22.

[26] Inkeles and Geiger, *op. cit.*

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In most of the letters examined there was no indication of a presumed cause of failure beyond the simple assertion of non-performance of assigned duty. Never was the party or the policy challenged; in almost 90 percent of the letters there was an explicit calling to account of one person, a group of persons or an organization held not to be carrying on the job properly. Inkeles and Geiger conclude that the system of letters of complaint serves as one more lever of top-level control over the bureaucracy, as a channel for airing personal grievances, releasing tensions and providing an escape valve for pressures under a regime in which relatively free expression of views is impossible. The letters deflect hostility against the executors rather than the determiners of policy.

Papers Criticizing Papers

IN submitting his complaints to the newspapers, the Soviet citizen, says a former Soviet journalist writing from his own experience, is thoroughly aware of the implications of the Soviet press structure.[27] He addresses complaints regarding his immediate superiors on the shop level to the factory paper, but his complaints regarding actions of the plant's director are addressed solely to the papers of the city, the province or the industrial trust with jurisdiction over the plant, for the plant newspaper cannot criticize the plant's director or party committee. This can be done only by party, government or management at a higher level. In other words, at its own territorial-administrative level the newspaper is a house organ, subservient to those who own and publish it; to persons and organizations on the levels below it, the newspaper is a fierce watchdog and crusader.

The press hierarchy has its own system of "criticism and self-criticism"; newspapers consider it their duty to scold or praise the papers below them in the territorial-administrative scale. Province papers criticize district papers, republic papers take the province papers to task, and "central" papers often berate or praise republic, province or district papers alike. (As noted earlier, nobody, of course, criticizes *Pravda*.) A newspaper's criticism of another paper is printed under the standing headline "Review of the Press" or "From the Latest Mail." A characteristic "Review of the Press" in *Pravda* attacks *Udmurtskaia Pravda* (Udmurt Truth), organ of a province party committee in the Urals, in these terms:

Unplanned and not always wise news items and correspondence appearing in the paper in the "Party Life" column do not give an idea of the full-blooded life of the party organizations of plants and factories, collective farms, state farms and cultural institutions. How much the paper would gain from lively articles by party officials if they appeared more often! . . . The Udmurt Province Party Committee, of course, reads its paper. Why then do they tolerate the fact that *Udmurtskaia Pravda* stands aloof from the life of party organizations? [28]

The Soviet editor perhaps should not be blamed for his shortcomings, for he has no easy time of it. Often he is appointed by the party when he does not possess specialized professional training.[29] Then he is moved into other party jobs when he has hardly begun his career in the press.

Partiinaia zhizn complains:

Can editors of the district and city papers improve and grow in their jobs in the Dagestan Autonomous Republic if 43 percent of them were shifted in 1953 and 61 percent in 1954? In these two periods 29 percent and 40 percent of the editors in Rostov Province were replaced, and 30 percent and 40 percent in Tomsk Province. It is not surprising that, with such rapid turnover, more than half of all the editors of district and city newspapers in the country have less than two years' tenure in newspaper work.[30]

The magazine goes on to object to another difficulty: editors are constantly drafted by their party committees for temporary non-editorial tasks whenever a propaganda campaign or the harvesting and sowing campaigns are under way, and as a result cannot devote due attention to their editorial work.

Comrade Yudin, executive secretary [managing editor] of the Puchez District newspaper in Ivanovo Province, reports that the editor has only ten days of the month for work on the paper. The rest of the time he is busy with various assignments for the district committee.[31]

This type of complaint appears frequently in the Soviet press.

[27] See A. Finn, *Experiences of a Soviet Journalist*, mimeographed, Russian Research Program, New York, 1954, pp. 17–20.

[28] "Review of the Press: Aloof from the Life of Party Organizations," *Pravda*, August 27, 1955, p. 2.

[29] See M. Kolosov, "How Soviet Newspapermen are Trained," *Vestnik*, No. 2, 1952, pp. 104–07.

[30] "The Soviet Journalist," *Partiinaia Zhizn*, No. 9, May 1955, p. 6.

[31] *Ibid.*

NOTE

On page 51 of this issue our readers will find a new section of "Correspondence." It is intended as a forum in which readers and authors may debate any aspect of the various matters touched upon in this publication.

Due to reasons of space, the second of two articles on the history of the Italian Communist Party could not be placed in this issue. The article will appear in the May-June issue and will include discussion of the impact on Italian communism of the recent Twentieth CPSU Congress held in Moscow.

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Concluding Remarks

TO sum up what has been shown, the Soviet press in every aspect of its organization and operation reflects the function which has been assigned to it in the controlled society of communism. It exists for one purpose—to serve the single party and the state as an instrument for influencing and containing public thought on a mass scale; if it chances to serve the reader also, that is purely coincidental. To make sure that the press fulfills this function, the Soviet regime has established an elaborate system of controls over newspaper and editorial personnel and over the printed word itself.

For all of these controls and censorship, however, the Soviet press sometimes defeats itself. Its silences and omissions tend to place a high value on rumor. Eventually a considerable part of the omissions and silences and distortions become known to the public, if only through reversal of the party line, as in the case of Tito—a hero one day, a villain the next, and now courted for a friend. In these circumstances it can be hoped that at least some Soviet readers have learned to distinguish a double image on the printed page: to see not merely what is printed (or what is omitted, if it can be deduced), but why.

Censorship in the USSR—A Documented Record

By MERLE FAINSOD

IN an interview printed in the *U. S. News and World Report* on November 11, 1955, Boris Kampov-Polevoi, head of a delegation of Soviet journalists then visiting the United States, made the rather startling claim that Soviet press censorship had been abolished after World War II and that "at the present time our only form of censorship is the good sense of every editor." He further asserted that books are not subject to any kind of censorship and that *Glavlit*, the chief administration for literary affairs, "does not have censorship functions," though he added the qualification that there are certain "scientific spheres" in which material cannot be printed before consultation with *Glavlit*. His colleague, Valentin Berezhkov, deputy chief editor of *Novye Vremia* (New Times), emphasized that "publications which deal with domestic and foreign policy problems" receive no instructions and directives from *Glavlit* and that editors rely exclusively on their own judgement in deciding what to write and how.

Careful students of the Soviet system may well wonder whether these assertions bear any resemblance to reality. Although foreign correspondents in Moscow have noted a certain relaxation of censorship since the death of Stalin, the monolithic tone of the Soviet press itself persists unchanged, and there is at least reason to doubt that it represents a triumph of spontaneous editorial harmony. Despite the disingenuous affirmations of editorial independence by Polevoi, there is abundant evidence in recent Soviet pronouncements that party supervision of the press continues close and direct. What remains unillumined is instrumentation, the devices by which the Soviet press is directed and controlled and the procedures by which censorship is enforced. In the absence of reliable information on current practices, one must turn to the past for clues.

Probably the richest collection of documents on the operations of Soviet censorship which is available in the West is contained in the so-called Smolensk Archive, a treasure house of party, governmental and police files extending over the period 1917–1939.[1] The archive includes one issue, Number 8, for the year 1934 of the *Bulletin of the Glavlit RSFSR and OVTs* (organs of military censorship), a publication labeled secret which circulated to members of the Soviet censorship apparatus and contained articles and orders addressed to them. There is also a 1934 file of secret instructions signed by the Chief Censor of an area referred to as the Western *Oblast* and designed to guide the work of *raion*, or district censors. In addition, there are scattered copies of central censorship directives to the press and a miscellaneous array

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Mr. Fainsod is Professor of Government at Harvard University and author of *How Russia is Ruled* (Harvard University Press, 1953). The present article is the forerunner of a longer study of the Smolensk Archive to be published in the future. The author wishes to acknowledge indebtedness to the Rand Corporation, Washington, D. C. for making the present study possible, and to Mr. Gregory J. Massell for his research assistance on the materials utilized in the article.

[1] The quotations used in this article are translated from documents in the Smolensk Archive (readers are referred to the Editors' Note on p. 3—Ed.).

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of material on proscribed books and authors, on the removal of so-called counterrevolutionary publications from libraries, and allied topics. These documents make it possible for the first time to view the work of the Soviet censorship apparatus and the problems which Soviet censors encounter.

Index Expurgatorius—Soviet Version

THE basic charter of Soviet censorship as it operated in the mid–1930's was the *perechen*, a detailed list of items which censors were charged with preventing from appearing in print or on the radio. The list included a wide range of military, economic, and political secrets. In the military sphere, data were withheld on the location of military forces, defense establishments, war factories, airfields, bridges, novel Soviet weapons, new operational-tactical views, and instructions on warfare. The *perechen* listed military units which could be mentioned in the press. The identification of all other units was forbidden. "When it is indispensable to refer to a military unit on the forbidden list," declared Circular #19, "it shall be done only in the form of 'the N-unit'." Censors were instructed to emphasize that *Osoaviakhim*—the paramilitary Society for the Promotion of Defense, Aviation, and the Chemical Industry—was "a strictly civilian organization."

Prohibitions in the economic field were almost as drastic. For the year 1934 no quantitative data on crop-yields in any locality were to be published unless such data first appeared in *Pravda* or *Izvestia*. All numerical data pertaining to grain deliveries and purchases for the USSR as a whole as well as localities were ordered withheld. The prohibition extended to percentage as well as absolute figures, except that *raions* were permitted to report grain deliveries in percentages on a 1933 base. Otherwise, *Glavlit* pronounced, deliveries could only be characterized as "good" or "bad". Specific news on railroad construction in certain areas and on the hiring of labor for these projects was also interdicted. Caution was enjoined in publicizing cattle diseases: the geographical location of epidemics and the number of cattle involved were to be omitted. News on sales of Soviet bonds abroad, on loans to Outer Mongolia and other eastern countries, on export losses, and on waves of withdrawals from savings banks was also forbidden.

In the political sphere, the major concern of the censors was to prevent ideological deviations and "misrepresentation of Soviet reality." The main brunt of the campaign against ideological deviations was directed at alleged relics of the "left-wing" and "right-wing" oppositions, but even such relatively "harmless" works as A. Kiriako and G. Druzhinin's *What Does a Harvest Depend On?* or a book of poems by V. Shiskov were ordered suppressed because of their alleged "counterrevolutionary character." Detailed data on court cases, crimes, and convictions were to be withheld, and descriptions of the activities of the OGPU deleted. Special care was to be exercised to stop the publication of "distorted" pictures of Stalin and Lenin. Censors were to guard against exaggerating the incidence of *kulak* terror, arson, the murder of Soviet officials, election disorders, or other phenomena calculated to emphasize "internal instability" in the USSR or the activities of anti-Soviet elements. The *Glavlit* bulletin deplored that in some cases

. . . the *local* Soviet press sheds light on the class struggle in such a manner as to become unwittingly a supplier of illustrations for foreign agents to be placed in the bourgeois press. From these reports one may construct a picture of the extraordinary vitality of anti-Soviet elements, of their "force" and "heroism" as against the helplessness of Soviet organs.

These examples do not exhaust the list of forbidden topics. The Smolensk Archive unfortunately does not contain a complete *perechen;* the items cited above are quoted in the correspondence of the Chief Censor of the Western Oblast or referred to in articles in the *Glavlit* bulletin. From these sources it is clear that the *perechen* went through a process of constant revision; new items were constantly added while others were deleted as circumstances changed. Every censor was expected to acquire intimate familiarity with the *perechen;* its guide lines were designed to give coherence and unity to the exercise of the censorial craft.

It should, however, be stressed that the task of controlling Soviet mass communications was far

A Note to the Reader

The descending administrative levels of Soviet government and party organs often are designated by contractions of the Russian terms for region (*krai*), province (*oblast*), district (*raion*), and city (*gorod*). In the above article, the lower level organs of *Glavlit,* the chief administration for literary affairs (another name for the censorship apparatus), are referred to as *Oblit, Krailit, Railit, Gorlit,* and *Raigorlit,* respectively the provincial, regional, district, city, and district-city branches of the administration. Similarly, references are made to lower level organs of the Communist Party as *Obkom, Raikom,* and *Gorkom,* designating party committees at the province, district and city level.

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broader than censorship alone. Positive guidance in the form of thematic plans and news treatment was provided initially through the Press Section of the Central Committee Secretariat and corresponding units in the lower party apparatus; the local newspapers took their tone and political lead from *Pravda*, the journal of the party Central Committee, and from Tass, the central news service, which in turn operated under the general supervision of the Central Committee Secretariat. The censorship organs had a more limited function; theirs was the negative responsibility of preventing undesirable items from appearing in the communication media. In 1934 the censorial responsibility was shared by *Glavlit* and the OVTs, or organs of military censorship. Coordination of the activities of these two groups was insured by concentrating direction of their work in the same individual. Thus B. Volin, who held the position of Chief of *Glavlit RSFSR*, also served as the Emissary of the USSR Council of Peoples' Commissars on Guarding Military Secrets in the Press. The Bulletin of *Glavlit* was at the same time the central publication of the organs of military censorship. At lower administrative levels *Glavlit* censors were supposed to coordinate their work with OVT representatives.

The Mechanics of Censorship

CENSORSHIP as it was practiced in the mid-1930's was of two types: 1) the direct inspection and control of printed material over which the censor had jurisdiction, and 2) preventive, or as it was called, prophylactic censorship. The latter type of activity involved taking steps in advance of the production of printed or oral material in order to lighten the load of direct inspection. Censors were required to keep newspaper-editors and printing establishments constantly informed of changes in the *perechen*. Copies of the *perechen* were provided to the party's so-called Secret Sections in factories, enterprises, and administrations, and these sections had to get advance clearance on all references (in papers, speeches, and meetings) to facts and figures of military significance or other matters involving potential violations of the *perechen*. Thus preliminary censorship began in the Secret Sections. In the words of V. Babkin, Chief of the *Gorkovski Krailit:*

> This has made the censor's work easier . . . transgressions of the *perechen* are becoming a rarity because now *all factory* officials, before submitting any kind of material to newspapers, meetings, conferences, *etc.,* have to clear them with their Secret Sections.

The day-to-day inspection work of the censorship organs was regulated by precise rules. These rules specified that every publication—party, governmental, trade union, and cooperative—had to be checked by a representative of the censorship before it could appear in print. Checks were to be made both before final printing and after printing. Censors were required to compare the final texts with earlier changes, and they had to make certain that no record of changes would remain in the printing establishment. All material embodying the censor's changes was to be sent to higher echelons in the censorship apparatus with notations on the censor's motive for making the changes. "Control samples" of censored publications were to be dispatched systematically to the higher organs of military censorship, *Oblit*, the State Central Book Chamber, the Special Collection of OGIZ (the State Publishing House), and to the local OGPU (NKVD). No public lectures were to take place without a censor's check on the "thesis" and "conspectus", with the exception of lectures organized by the local *Kult props* (Cultural Propaganda sections) of party committees or by the local *Ispolkoms*, the executive committees of soviets. In the case of radio broadcasts, all material subject to censorship was to be presented for check not later than one hour before the scheduled broadcast. All broadcasts were required to follow the exact text as approved or changed by the censor. All censored broadcast materials were to be filed and burned at three month intervals. Transgressions of the censorship rules were to be reported at once to higher censorship authorities who were instructed to undertake administrative or court proceedings against the transgressors.

Censure of the Censors

THESE rules and procedures, it should be stressed, represented goals and objectives rather than a level of actual achievement. In practice, as the files of the Smolensk Archive make abundantly clear, the operations of censorship were seriously handicapped by a lack of trained, politically reliable cadres and the indifference of lower party organizations to the need for this type of activity. A top secret letter of March 20, 1934, from Shilman, one of the secretaries of the Western Oblast Committee, may serve as an example. The letter read in part:

> In many *raions* the censorship situation remains unfavorable . . . In Nevilsk and Sychevsk *raions* the names of military units doing secret work were allowed to be divulged. Pustoshka and Nevel allowed the mention of the construction of paved roads of a strategic character . . . A number of *raikoms* . . . have not as yet chosen censorship workers. . . .

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Even in the Moscow region, ordinarily a model, serious deficiencies were observed. There the various *raions* of the *oblast* were divided into three categories according to their censorship significance. In the first category—*raions* with defense establishments, military units, and a developed net of printing and publishing establishments—censorship personnel was supposed to be free from all other work and thoroughly checked for political reliability. Even so, only 20 of the 23 *raions* in this category had full-time censors.

In the second category, which included 36 *raions* with relatively few printing and publishing establishments but with military units and defense installations, the censors worked only on a part-time basis, and the Chief of the Moscow *Oblit* complained that they were of poor quality. Mostly, they consisted of chiefs of the party-cabinets of district committees, employes of the *raion* Soviet executive committees, and officers in district military departments. No educational personnel was employed because, reported the head of the Moscow *Oblit:*

. . . experience has shown that they are the worst elements at such work. They lack discipline; they simply place the censor's seal on a document and let it go.

In the third category of predominantly agricultural *raions*, which typically had one *raion* paper and a small printing establishment, censorial duties were vested in party secretaries, chairmen of Soviet executive committees, newspaper editors, and directors of the *raion* education departments. Here military secrecy was less important because of the absence of defense establishments, but the publications of such *raions* characteristically revealed the highest incidence

Caption above: Rabbit-Editor
Name of newspaper: The Stump
Caption below: It's risky to annoy a lion, or a bear too . . . I'll write that all the defects are the fault of the mole: he probably won't see our newspaper anyhow . . .

—From *Krokodil*, September 20, 1955.

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of "political-ideological deviations" and reflected the inexperience and lack of political awareness of the amateur censors who monitored the publications.

In order to overcome these deficiencies, periodic campaigns were staged to raise the qualifications of district censors. The "required reading" for all censors included Lenin's and Stalin's writings on the press, party decisions on the press, Stalin's *Problems of Leninism* and his article "On Some Problems in the History of Bolshevism," the reports and decisions of the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU in 1934, the *perechen*, the Systematized Instructions to Organs of *Glavit*, the *Pamiatka Railita* (Handbook of the District Censor), and a volume by Fogolevich on *The Existing Laws of the Press*. Familiarity with these publications was a *sine qua non* for censors; all were required to stand examinations to test their knowledge of these documents.

Triumphs and Failures

THE Bulletin of *Glavlit*, which served as the house organ of the censorship apparatus, provides a remarkable mirror of the censorship at work. District censors proudly boast of the "transgressions" of the *perechen* which they succeeded in eliminating. For example, a certain Comrade Alekseyev, the Orekhovo-Zuyevo chief censor, lists a number of triumphs in an article entitled "How I Overcame Difficulties". First he prevented the publication of a letter in a factory newspaper which read:

We are in absolutely no need of the labor union. We pay money, but no help is forthcoming. I have been paying dues for eight years, but the benefits are not even a penny's worth. The labor-union organization does not do anything—it only collects money.

He stopped the same paper from printing the following about *Osoaviakhim:*

In the beginning of [its] activities, one of the main shortcomings was bad attendance. Of 80 members 20–25 members used to attend, but after certain concrete measures were taken, including arrests, the situation improved very quickly . . .

He cut out a sentence which read:

In *the future war, and that war is indispensable,* the use of [modern weapons] will wipe out the difference between front and rear.

He also eliminated the following headline to commemorate an *udarnitsa* [woman shock-brigade worker]:

If you are an *udarnitsa* in the factory, you will also be an *udarnitsa* in the other world.

A long article on the work of the censorship in the Gorki region also lists some of the deletions for which it was responsible. One was a letter to the editor of the *Lyskovskii Udarnik* [Lyskova Shock-Brigade Worker] reporting that *kulaks* who had been expelled from a *kolkhoz* were "terrorizing" and beating up members of the *kolkhoz* without any measures being taken to check them. Among other deletions were a report of murders of Komsomol and Red Army activists and threats against the lives of village correspondents; a story of the disruption of a newly formed *kolkhoz* by *kulaks* and priests; a tale of low morale among army recruits; and a striking headline which read "Alarm—the Village Spasskoye Reverts to Last Year's *Kulak* Sabotage." Such news treatment, argues the censor, can only serve as a "boon" for foreign agents and the bourgeois press. "The whole thing is like a photograph; nothing has to be added."

In other articles there are sorrowful recitals of "transgressions" which escaped the attention of censors. A critical report on the Activities of the Biezhetskii *Gorlit* was not without its amusing sidelights. Among the sentences which the censor failed to catch were the following:

The radio station broadcast questions and answers on the Seventeenth Party Congress amid dances, foxtrots, *etc.*

Listening to foreign stations is prohibited. We will relay Moscow.

The number of illnesses in our enterprise has been substantially higher than the Control number.

We have been granted 1000 paid days for 100 workers for the whole year. We surpassed that number. Our stomach and intestinal diseases were higher by 52 percent, malaria by 217 percent.

The occupational hazards of the censorship apparatus also find their reflection in the *Bulletin*. On the one hand, the censors are enjoined by their superiors to adhere strictly to the *perechen;* on the other hand, they are also condemned for "superfluous secrecy." Some censors "sign everything that is shoved in front of them—if only it is not straight counterrevolution." But the more usual reaction is to "play it safe" and eliminate *all* news items which raise the slightest question. Thus one censor refused to allow the publication of a criticism of local rail depot operations on the "pretext" that it was impermissible to provide the "Fascists" with materials for anti-Soviet campaigns. The same censor withheld an item stating that some older members of a *kolkhoz* had two cows. The reason given was that the possession of two cows might signify a *kulak* movement!

Another district censor who insisted on cutting materials from the press without regard to what was said found himself the subject of a feuilleton in the Smolensk newspaper, the *Rabochii Put* (Workers'

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Path). Investigation revealed that the censor was completely "illiterate" in political matters, and he was removed from his job. The incident was used by the *oblast* censor to warn *raion* censors not to engage in "self-insurance deviations" (by excessive cutting of materials), and they were instructed not to make actual changes in the text without the agreement of newspaper editors. At the same time *Rabochii Put* was admonished for its public attack on a censor, and all censors were reminded that the *perechen* prohibited publication of any news pertaining to the methods and rules of censorship organs.

The unenviable dilemma of the censor faced with the need to distinguish between necessary and superfluous secrecy was echoed throughout the pages of the *Bulletin*. The overriding compulsion, however, was to follow the *perechen* rigidly. While "distortionists" who erred on the side of excision were roundly condemned, the more serious crime was to permit secret information to leak through the press. For this "deviation" there was no forgiveness.

The trials and tribulations of the censorship apparatus included serious jurisdictional problems and inter-bureaucratic rivalries. The *Glavlit Bulletin* makes clear that the exercise of the censorial craft met resistance. The newspaper editor was frequently a political power in his own right and did not always take kindly to censorship. Censors complained that newspaper editors and printing establishments looked upon censorship as an "unnecessary formality." The chief of the Kuntsevski *Raigorlit* reported that editors "were dissatisfied with his withholdings" and appealed to the *raikom*, or district committee of the party. The censor in this instance was upheld by the *raikom*. When friction continued, one of the editors was fired. After that "the attitude of all editors . . . sharply changed for the better."

Another censor, referred to as Y., in the Muromskii *raion* also reported "great resistance" of editors to his activities. The *raion* newspaper editor refused to admit Y. to the office when Y. arrived to assume his duties for the first time. After a conference of editors at the *raikom*, there was some "improvement". When Y. insisted on eliminating offensive passages from the newspaper, however, the editor again refused to obey. Y. had to resort to the help of "special organs"; the latter were "very cooperative."

Still another censor reported that the response of printing establishments to tighter censorship controls was "nasty"; employes proceeded "deliberately" to "distort" texts and engaged in "vicious misprinting" in order to discredit the censorship. Instead of "socialism" they printed "capitalism"; they referred to the right-wing "deviation" as the glorious (*slavnyi*) instead of chief (*glavnyi*) "danger"; they printed "chairman" Savinkov instead of "provocateur" Savinkov: and they described one individual as a "son of an *uriadnik*" (Tsarist policeman) instead of a "son of an *udarnik*" (a shock-brigade worker). Although it is more than probable that these cases were due to carelessness rather than to deliberate sabotage, the censor brought the matter to the attention of the *raikom*, and several printers were fired.

The sanctions available to the censor varied in severity. The various stages are described in one article as follows:

1) "explanation"; 2) "warnings"—twice or thrice; 3) action by the *raikom* or *gorkom* of the party which involved summoning the culprit to the *Kult prop*, the section of the party Secretariat which supervised publications; 4) "action through the OGPU". "After these stages of action, especially the last one," reports one censor, "tampering with censorship regulations fell in frequency." In addition, the procurators (Soviet-style district attorneys) were under instructions to prosecute all those responsible for breaking the rules of censorship. When such a case came to the attention of district censors, they were supposed "to formulate an act" and file it with the procurator, but never without the sanction of the *oblast* chief censor. How frequently such prosecutions occurred the Smolensk Archive does not reveal.

Book Burning in Moscow

PERHAPS the most dramatic censorship material in the Smolensk Archive involves the book purges of the mid-1930's. Detailed lists of books to be confiscated were transmitted through the *Glavlit* hierarchy to the heads of district education departments who were ordered to confiscate the books and transfer them to the district censors. A typical order issued in June 1934 with the notation *secret* read as follows: "All editions of all works written by authors listed [below] shall be confiscated forthwith; the listed authors have been unmasked as counterrevolutionaries or members of nationalistic organizations." There followed a list of 46 authors, most of them with Ukrainian names. On March 7, 1935 the Lenin Library of Smolensk was ordered to confiscate all books by Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others and to concentrate them under seal in a special compartment to which only the Library's director had access.

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Another order of June 21, 1935 broadened the list of "Trotskyite-Zinovievite counterrevolutionary literature." Besides the works of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, the proscribed editions included books by such well-known Old Bolsheviks and former oppositionists as A. Shliapnikov, M. I. Yavorskii, G. Gorbachev, E. A. Preobrazhenskii, V. Nevskii, B. Bulakh, B. Barden, N. Zalutski, A. Lunacharskii, G. Safarov, A. Slepkov, V. Bolosievich, and many others. The confusion generated by these orders is reflected in the Archive correspondence.

In a memorandum dated February 19, 1935, and addressed to the Education Department of the Western Oblast, Ivanov, Director of the Smolensk Lenin Library, and Stalmakova, Senior Consultant in the Department of Bibliography, point out that they had been receiving many urgent requests for guidance on book removals from many smaller libraries and even party cabinets. They raise a whole series of questions. What should be done with speeches by Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin *et al.* at party Congresses, plenums of the Central Committee, in the Comintern, the Congress of Soviets, *etc.*? What of anthologies on Marxism and other subjects written or edited jointly by Lenin, Zinoviev, V. Adoratskii, and others? What of Lenin's writings edited by Kamenev? What of bibliographies and memoirs about Lenin by Bukharin, Kamenev, and other banned authors? What should be done in cases where Trotsky, *e.g.*, had written an article in an issue of the *Communist International?* Should the whole number be confiscated? What of the writings of V. Bonch-Bruyevich, Sverchkov, John Reed and others, who in descriptions of the first days of the Revolution spoke "of present traitors and opportunists" as "leaders of the Revolution"?

If these questions cannot be immediately answered, the memorandum continues, it would be useful to receive instructions on the fate of a long list of items which are included in an addendum. The list comprises hundreds of political works, as well as books and articles by economists, technical and administrative specialists, veterinarians, agrotechnicians, and others on sundry subjects. The list also includes various maps, slogans, postcards, music, editions of Stalin's works in Chinese and Mordvenese ("due to profound distortions in translation"), high school text books, books where footnotes refer to Trotsky and other proscribed writers, placards and propaganda leaflets with slogans and likenesses (or paintings) of opposition leaders.

The Archive contains no reply to this memorandum, but there is a report dated June 5, 1935 of a committee appointed to inspect the libraries of Smolensk. Despite repeated confiscation drives, the committee reported that it came upon scores of books by Zinoviev and Trotsky, *The Workers' Opposition Platform* of A. Shliapnikov and S. Medvedev, *The History of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party* by the noted Menshevik Y. Martov, poems by Sergei Yessenin, and many other proscribed works. These books, however, were found primarily in small factory libraries.

Evidence of the disorderly character of the purge is contained in a top secret *Glavlit* order of June 21, 1935 signed by B. Volin, the RSFSR *Glavlit* Chief and USSR emissary on Guarding Military Secrets in the Press. The order read:

During the removal of Trotskyite-Zinovievite literature from libraries there has simultaneously been going on a "purge" of libraries, not controlled nor directed by anyone, resulting in the pilfering and damage of libraries' book reserves.
I am ordering that:

1) The general purge and mass removal of books from libraries shall be curtailed at once.

2) The removal of counterrevolutionary Trotskyite-Zinovievite literature from libraries and warehouses shall proceed strictly in accordance with the enclosed lists . . .

3) The removal of listed literature is to be effected:
- **a) in *krai* and *oblast* centers—directly by the *Krai-Oblast* Chief of *Glavlit* or his deputy in Cooperation with a representative from NKVD;**
- **b) in *raion* libraries—by emissaries of the *Krai* or *Oblit* (*Railit Chiefs*) in cooperation with *raion* emissaries of NKVD.**

4) Two copies of each confiscated work shall be left in the Special Departments of especially designated libraries of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the party, the Academy of Sciences, the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, the Lenin Library (Moscow), the Saltykov-Shchedrin Library (Leningrad), the Communist International library, libraries of the Universities of Moscow and Leningrad, central libraries of main cities of Union Republics, *krais, oblasts,* and university cities as well as in the governmental library of the TSIK (the Central Executive Committee of the USSR).

5) The removal of books designated in the lists shall be accompanied by the formulation of an act; the books are to be sealed and sent together with the act of removal to *krai* and *oblast* administrations of the NKVD.

6) All books which had previously been removed in accord with Order #40 (later recalled) and which are not mentioned in the enclosed list shall forthwith be returned . . . to the appropriate libraries.

7) Information on progress in effecting this order shall be transmitted to me on July 1st and August 1st.

Despite this effort to regularize book removals from the libraries, chaos continued to prevail at local levels. The example of Kozelsk will serve to illustrate the

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problem. On March 16, 1936 Kagan (head of the Division of Party Propaganda, Agitation, and Press of the Western *obkom*) dispatched the following secret letter to the secretary of the Kozelsk *raikom:*

Indications from a number of *raions* show that there is a bad state of affairs with regard to the removal of Trotskyite-Zinovievite counterrevolutionary literature from public libraries . . .

The *obkom* orders another check on the removal of this literature from all libraries of the *raion* without exception.

The removed literature should be transferred to the organs of the Administration of the NKVD. The list of literature subject to removal is in the possession of the latter.

Prodded by this letter, the NKVD apparently took matters into its own hands and purged the library somewhat "too fundamentally." As a result the *raikom* secretary now found himself the object of a protest from the RSFSR People's Commissar of Education. A letter dated May 15, 1936 and signed by Rabinovich, the Deputy Chief of the Library Administration of the RSFSR, read as follows:

According to information received by the Library Administration, a large number of books have been removed from the Kozelsk *raion* library by the NKVD worker, Comrade Podyshkin, without notifying either the chief of the library or the *raion* Department of Public Education. How many and what books have been taken to the NKVD is not known.

In view of the fact that all removals can take place only with the sanction of the Chief of the *raion* Department of Public Education (who is personally responsible for the condition of the library), we ask you to take measures to arrange beforehand the actions of all organizations in improving the library's reserve of books.

As this example illustrates, the purge of the libraries operated erratically. At the grass roots where central directives had to be translated into action, book removals and the operations of censorship generally were conditioned by indolence and ignorance as well as excessive zeal.

Yet an analysis of the documents in the Smolensk Archive also makes clear that censorship was steadily and ominously tightening its grip during the 1930's. The processes of totalitarianization were reaching out even into the most remote rural *raions*. The enforced unanimity of the press and radio operated within an increasingly rigid censorial code. The libraries were becoming the repository of an official Stalinist orthodoxy. As the voices of dissent were expunged from the historical record, the way was prepared for the apotheosis of the all-powerful leader. The symbol of the censor became the intellectual hallmark of the Stalinist era.

But the documents of the Archive also reveal more. They show the censors in all their human frailty burdened with a dangerous discretion and enmeshed in a network of difficult relationships with newspaper editors, radio station directors, librarians, party committees, NKVD representatives, and bureaucratic superiors. One sees the censorial apparatus struggling to conceal the seamy side of Soviet reality and paradoxically highlighting what they hoped to hide. And dimly perceptible, in the thrust of the censorship itself, one catches a glimpse of the forces of spontaneity which the censorship sought to contain, the aspirations toward self-expression in Soviet society which not even the most highly trained minion of *Glavlit* could wholly extirpate.

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The Shifting Line in Soviet Orientalogy

By W. Z. LAQUEUR

THE recent revival of Oriental studies in the Soviet Union obviously has more than academic significance when viewed against the backdrop of Soviet diplomatic efforts to win friends and influence people in the non-Communist lands of the Middle and Far East. The revival primarily concerns studies on contemporary Asiatic problems and is the more striking because it follows the almost total eclipse of such studies from 1938 to 1954. Since May 1955, moreover, there has been a sharp and significant change in the whole approach of Soviet Eastern experts toward the national governments and movements in various countries of the non-Communist East. This faithfully reflects the new, altered line of Communist diplomacy in Asia epitomized so dramatically by the Khrushchev-Bulganin goodwill tour of India, Burma and Afghanistan.

To indulge in a practice much favored by Soviet authors, one may divide the historical development of Soviet Oriental studies into six periods. The decade from 1919 to 1928 might be termed the "golden age" of Soviet Orientalogy, during which the attitude toward Asia was generally friendly. From 1929 to 1934, reflecting the general hardening of the Comintern line, this sympathetic attitude was replaced by hostility toward the Asiatic national movements, and there was a corresponding decline of Oriental studies. Then, with the switch to worldwide "popular front" tactics in 1935, a revival got under way, only to be cut short in 1937 by the Great Purge, which hit Soviet Oriental experts particularly hard.

From 1923 to 1948, encompassing the entire duration of World War II, events in Asia were largely ignored in the USSR, and Oriental studies remained in eclipse. In 1948 Soviet policy in Asia again began showing gradually increasing activity, but the almost total absence of studies on contemporary Eastern affairs continued until 1954. The great revival began in the latter part of 1954 and continues at the present time. As already noted, the revival was marked at first by a sharply critical attitude toward the non-Communist national regimes and movements of the East, shifting suddenly to a sugared tone of friendship in the summer of 1955.

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Early Bolshevik Indifference

THE "golden age" of Soviet Orientalogy developed, curiously enough, against a background of relative indifference toward Asia on the part of the newly-established Bolshevik regime. Communism in 1917 was not much more interested in that part of the world than were the other Western political movements of the period.

To be sure, Lenin way back in 1913 had written an article entitled "Backward Europe and Progressive Asia," which is often quoted today as proof of his prescience.[1] But Lenin's orientation was wholly western, and he himself acknowledged that this title was a bit facetious. He noted, as did others, the great spiritual impact which the Russian revolution of 1905 had had on many Asian countries; and he also remarked that by and large the middle class in Asia was still joining forces with the proletariat whereas, in Europe, the proletariat had become "the only progressive force." It was only in one of his last articles, published some years after the 1917 revolution, that Lenin recognized the long-range importance of Asia to the future of world communism, declaring that the outcome of the struggle would be determined in the last resort by the fact that the USSR, India and China together account for the vast majority of mankind.[2]

Despite this acknowledgment of the potential importance of Asia, the East occupied an inconspicuous place in overall Soviet policy calculations throughout most of the 1920's.[3] The Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in the fall of 1920, did—it is true—make at least a symbolic gesture toward spreading the Bolshevik revolutionary philosophy to the unawakened Asian masses; and the early 1920's also saw the short-lived Soviet irruption into Iran and flirtation with Turkey. Although somewhat greater attention was given to Asian affairs during the latter 1920's, it was focused almost exclusively on the question of Communist tactics in China; Stalin and

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (4th Edition), Moscow. Vol. XIX, pp. 77–8.

[2] V. I. Lenin, "Better Less, But Better" (March 2, 1923), *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXIII, p. 458.

[3] It is interesting to note that Stalin, in 1918, published two articles stressing the importance of the East: one entitled "Do Not Forget the East" and the other "Ex Oriente Lux" (Light from the Orient). See J. Stalin, *Collected Works*, Moscow, 1946–48. Vol. IV, pp. 171–3, 177–82. These articles were largely in protest against the early Bolshevik neglect of the East.

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the other party leaders evinced no real interest in the Middle East. The elaboration of theses in accordance with the exigencies of the time and of Soviet foreign policy was left to the lower echelons of the Comintern hierarchy.

The keynote of Communist policy with regard to Asia during this period had been laid down in the theses adopted by the Second Comintern Congress in 1920. In contrast to the sharply hostile line prescribed toward social democracy in Europe, the Second Congress theses stressed the necessity of supporting bourgeois movements of liberation in the colonial and backward countries of the East, and of entering into temporary alliances with them.[4] At the same time they ascribed special importance to supporting the peasant movements in these countries in opposition to the big landowners and "reactionary medieval influences."

The Leninist idea of temporary collaboration with the bourgeois democratic movements of Asia was not wholeheartedly welcomed by some of the Asiatic delegates to the Congress. Roy, the Indian representative, demanded that a clear-cut distinction be made between the bourgeois national movements which proposed to achieve their political aims within the framework of the existing order, and the struggle of the peasants directed against "every form of exploitation". Support of the latter, he argued, should not be sacrificed, even temporarily, to an expedient alliance with bourgeois elements. Nevertheless, the Leninist line prevailed.

The Heyday of Oriental Studies

AS a result of this mild, unrevolutionary policy for Asia, coupled with the relatively minor official concern over Eastern affairs, Soviet Orientalists enjoyed a fair amount of latitude in the early years after the revolution. In December 1921 they were allowed, with the government's blessing, to organize an all-Russian Association of Eastern Studies (VNAV), which became a subsection of the Commissariat of Nationalities; and for a time there was a parallel Ukranian association. Another center of Oriental research was the Moscow Institute of Eastern Studies. The principal organ of the Orientalists was the review *Novyi Vostok* (New East), published by the All-Russian Association of Eastern Studies from 1922 to 1930.

Broadly speaking, there were three groups of Orientalists, each with a different approach and outlook. First, there were the academicians, the scholars of great international standing, such as V. V. Bartold, S. F. Oldenburg and I. Y. Krachkovski; they continued their historical researches within the framework of the Academy of Sciences and seldom, if ever, turned their attention to topical Eastern affairs. A second group was composed of Communists without academic training but with academic ambitions, some quite capable and others of no distinction whatever. This group ran the review *Novyi Vostok* and had as its outstanding members Mikhail Pavlovich (Weltmann) and V. A. Gurko-Kriazhin, both Old Bolsheviks and experts on Middle Eastern political problems. Finally, there was a group of party, government and Comintern officials with special interest or on-the-spot experience in the East—men like G. I. Broido, key figure in the Communist subjugation of Turkestan, and Pavel Mif, later to play an active role as Comintern representative in China. Apart from defining the party line, the contribution of this group to Soviet Eastern studies was of little importance.

Even with the relative freedom allowed during this period, Soviet Orientalogy showed a definite party coloring. This was clearly evidenced by frequent statements in *Novyi Vostok* opposing the aim of Soviet Eastern studies to that allegedly pursued by Western Orientalists. In the words of Pavlovich:

We do not seek, in the East, ways and means of setting the clock back to century-old slavery and obscurantism; on the contrary, we look for ways of revolutionary development.[5]

Konstantin M. Troianovsky, another member of the group, touched upon the same theme in the inaugural issue of *Novyi Vostok*. It was clear to every revolutionary, he wrote, that for the colonial peoples of the east, there could be "no national liberation outside of social liberation." [6]

The Orientalists of this school published a great many books and pamphlets on Eastern problems (all too frequently based on secondary Western sources) seeking valiantly but not always successfully for evidences of a revolutionary spirit in the East. Indeed, the voluminousness of their writings on the subject appears strangely incongruous with the slight significance of Asiatic revolutionary movements during this period. There was to be an equally striking incon-

[4] *Theses and Statutes of the Third (Communist) International Adopted by the Second Congress, July 17 to August 7, 1920.* Communist International Second Congress, Leningrad, 1920.

[5] Mikhail Pavlovich, "Oktiabrskaia Revoliutsiia i Vostochnyi Vopros" (The October Revolution and the Eastern Question), *Novyi Vostok*, No. 15, 1926, p. 1 ff. See also article by V. A. Gurko-Kriazhin, *ibid.*, No. 19, 1926.

[6] K. M. Troianovski, "Nezavisimoe Korolstvo Yegipta" (The Independent Kingdom of Egypt), *Novyi Vostok*, No. 1, 1922. p. 94.

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gruity—in reverse—in the late 1940's, when these movements had gained real momentum and importance and there was no Soviet Orientalist literature to hail them.

Among the topics of primary interest to Soviet Orientalists in the 1920's, on the historical level, was the origin and social character of Islam, an issue which became the subject of protracted and acrimonious debate and which evoked a dozen or more conflicting theories.[7] On the political level, the paramount Orientalist task was to appraise the various national movements in the East in the light of Marxist-Leninist tenets and guide Communist relations with them along the desired channel.

It is interesting from an historian's viewpoint to note that the late 1920's found Soviet Orientalists devoting considerable attention to a proposal which was subsequently forgotten but now has regained prominence as a keystone of Soviet Asiatic policy. This was the thesis, put forth and developed at the Fifteenth CPSU Conference in 1926, that the Soviet Union could and should help to bring about the industrialization of the backward countries of Asia in order to prevent their engulfment by "capitalist imperialism."[8] Its author was Nikolai Bukharin, who was to be executed as a pro-Fascist "traitor" in the Stalinist purge of 1938.

Stiffening of the Line

IN spite of the Marxist tinge and flood-like volume of their publications, Soviet Orientalists began to come in for censure as early as 1925 on the ground that their studies were too apolitical.[9] But real pressure was not brought to bear on them until the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in September 1928, which marked a general stiffening of the international Communist line. In particular, the Sixth Congress' "Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-colonies" cast into the limbo the past line of collaboration with the national regimes and national liberation movements of the East, denouncing the Chinese Kuomintang as an "openly counterrevolutionary force" and Gandhism in India as a doctrine opposed to the class struggle and mass revolution. Other national leaders and movements fared no better. Henceforth, the battle-cry was to be agrarian revolution for the purpose of wresting power from the national bourgeoisie.[10]

As a direct repercussion of this shift, steps were taken to correct the allegedly apolitical approach of Soviet Orientalists. An all-union conference of Eastern experts was convened, at which a resolution was adopted criticizing the Association of Eastern Studies on the ground that it was constituted mainly of (1) persons who pretended to be Marxists but actually were not; (2) apolitical academicians; and (3) pseudo-scholars.[11] The Association eventually was dissolved and replaced by a new "Association of Marxist-Orientalists at the Comacademia". This imposing title and the name given to the new Association journal, *Revoliutsionnyi Vostok* (Revolutionary East), symbolized the change, which was designed to stress the divorce of Soviet Oriental studies from the "ivory tower" atmosphere of the Academy of Sciences.

Needless to say, the reorientation of the Comintern line in Asia, and consequently of the tone and content of Soviet Oriental studies, was not the result of any new revelations or discoveries on the theoretical level. It was an outgrowth of the changed international situation and, particularly, of the untoward turn of events in China where Chiang Kai-shek, after successfully establishing Kuomintang rule with Communist backing, had turned against the Reds in 1927.

Called upon to do a quick about-face, Soviet Orientalists now denounced the same national movements which hitherto had been considered communism's main allies, as "our main enemy in the backward countries, just as the Social Democrats are our chief foes in the more developed areas."[12] Particular opprobrium was heaped upon the left-wing or "national reformist" elements in the Kuomintang, the Indian Congress and the Egyptian Wafd. All these "national reformists" were against agrarian revolution, it was asserted, and historical experience demonstrated that without such revolution there could be no national liberation.

The Eastern nationalist leaders—Nahas Pasha, leader of the Egyptian Wafd; Reza Sha Pahlevi, ruler of Iran; and Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Kuomin-

[7] This controversy has been summarized by the Soviet Orientalist writer, N. A. Smirnov, in his book, *Ocherki Istorii Isucheniia Islama USSR* (Essays on the History of Islamic Studies in the USSR), Moscow, 1954. pp. 180–202.

[8] *XV Konferentsiia, 26ovo Oktiabria 3 Noiabria 1926 g., Stenograficheskyi Ochet* (Stenographic Record, 15th Conference, October 26–November 3, 1926) Gosizdat, Moscow, 1927.

[9] One of the more prominent critics was Lev Karakhan, onetime Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs under Maxim Litvinov. See his article, "Zadachi Vostokovedenia" (The Task of Eastern Studies), *Novyi Vostok*, No. 14, 1925. p. 1 ff.

[10] *Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies Adopted at the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, 1928.* Published in *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 8 (December 12, 1928), pp. 1659–76.

[11] Published in *Novyi Vostok*, No. 29, 1929. p. 21.

[12] L. Madyar, "O Natsional Reformizme" (On National Reformism), *Revoliutsionnyi Vostok*, No. 6, 1933. p. 24.

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tang—were charged with trying to exploit differences between the Soviet Union and the "imperialist powers" and with having sought a "rapprochement with the Soviet Union merely to strengthen their own position." [13] These accusations make even more interesting reading in 1956 than in 1933.

For Soviet Oriental studies this was a most difficult period. The academic historians continued their research but were hardly able to publish anything at all. *Revoliutsionnyi Vostok* had to eschew scholarly articles and concentrate on denouncing "national reformism". The commandments of the hour were to attack Japanese "social fascism" (the Social Democrats), to castigate Gandhi as one of the most odious figures among all the leaders of bourgeois nationalist movements, and so on.

Popular Front and Purge

AFTER roughly six years of this blustering, intransigent line, Soviet Orientalists were obliged to perform another about-face. With the adoption of the "popular front" as the keynote of Soviet world policy in 1935, the slogan of a wide coalition against fascism was proclaimed in Asia as in Europe. The "national reformists" again became allies of the Communists, and writers in *Revoliutsionnyi Vostok* had to find words of praise for both Gandhi and Chiang Kai-shek.

Another good example of the new shift was Iraq. In 1934, the Iraqui "national reformists" had been declared "the main obstacle to the development of the workers' movement." In 1937, the Iraqui government composed of the same "national reformists" was extolled for expressing the national aspirations of the Arab people.[14]

Soviet Orientalists adapted themselves to the new situation with comparative swiftness, for tendering the hand of friendship to the national movements of the East was far easier than the truculent line of 1929–1934. But time was running out fast. During the 1929–1934 period, Soviet Oriental studies had become completely politicized and, in fact, were carried on mainly by Comintern personnel. Consequently, when the latter were decimated by the Great Purge of 1937, Eastern studies received a mortal blow and virtually ceased to exist in any form, either academic or propagandistic.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] M. Kuperman, "Rabochie Dvizhenye v Irake" (The Workers' Movement in Iraq), *Revoliutsionnyi Vostok*, No. 6, 1934, p. 104; Vitol, "Gosudarstvennyi Perevorot v Irake" (The Coup d'Etat in Iraq), *Ibid.*, No. 1, 1937.

The "Association of Marxist-Orientalists" came to a sudden and unexplained end in 1937. The editors of *Revoliutsionnyi Vostok* vanished from view together with the ill-fated majority of Comintern officials, and publication ceased. Another periodical dealing with Far Eastern affairs, *Tikhii Okean* (The Pacific Ocean), lingered on until 1939, but then it expired, too.

Naturally, it was the official Communist spokesmen and propagandists who fared worst of all in the 1937–38 purges. Not a single one seems to have survived, and none has reappeared since the recent revival of Soviet Oriental studies. On the other hand, the academicians who had not meddled in politics despite all prodding fared considerably better. Many of them have lived to play a prominent part in the revival.

Between 1938 and 1948, there were no publications worth mentioning in the field of contemporary Eastern studies. Even comment in the press and radio was most cursory. Research institutions such as the Institute of Eastern Studies of the Academy of Sciences, the Oriental institutes of Moscow and Leningrad Universities, and the Eastern Faculty of the Central Asian University in Tashkent (specializing in the Middle East and Southeast Asia) continued to function in a restricted way. But their members preferred the relative security of the Middle Ages, or even more remote periods, to the treacherous ground of more recent eras.

The prolonged effacement of contemporary Eastern studies had another important cause in the temporary submersion of interest in Asian affairs and Soviet preoccupation with Europe throughout the period of World War II. By 1948, the postwar polarization of most of the world into two hostile camps and the brightening prospects for communism in the Far East injected new life into Soviet Asiatic policy. However, the revival of smoldering Soviet designs in Asia did not produce an immediate rebirth of Soviet Eastern studies. The period from 1948 to 1954 witnessed only the barest beginning of such a revival.

The initial sign was the publication in 1950 of a series of essays under the title *Uchenye Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedenia* (Learned Papers of the Institute of Eastern Studies). In 1953 the Institute published another series entitled *Kratkie Soobshcheniia Instituta Vostokovedenia* (Short Communications of the Institute of Eastern Studies). Some of these papers dealt with philological topics, but others with contemporary Eastern political problems, and the authors were the leading Soviet authorities in their respective fields such as A. M. Dyakov for India, E. M. Zhukov for the Far East, and A. A. Guber for Indonesia.

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Orientalist Renaissance

THE real comeback of Soviet Oriental studies got underway in 1954. It was marked by a decision to provide the Asian expert once more with a central organ of their own. After a period of preparation, the first issue of the new bimonthly, *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie* (Soviet Eastern Studies), appeared in May 1955, declaring in its preface that it would deal *inter alia* with "questions of culture and ideology pertaining to the countries of the East" and would seek to "unmask reactionary ideologies which hamper the successful struggle of the masses for social liberation and national independence." The desire of the Eastern peoples to create an Asiatic "zone of peace" was also praised:

> Only the fight of the Asian peoples, supported by the peace-loving peoples of the whole world, brought about the cessation of bloodshed in Korea and later in Indochina.[15]

While the new organ was still in preparation, a number of basic Eastern studies of more than ordinary interest appeared in print toward the close of 1954. Among them were the first volume of a projected four-volume work, *Noveishaia Istoria Stran Zarubezhnovo Vostoka* (Most Modern History of the Countries of the Foreign East), issued by Moscow University; a large volume on the peoples of Africa (*Narody Afriki*), published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences; and a survey of Islamic studies in the USSR, by N. A. Smirnov.[16] Other published material included Russian translations of books by Asian authors (a few of them non-Communists) and a revival, *Palestinski Sbornik* (Palestine Collection), once issued by the Russian-Palestine Society in Tsarist Russia.

In writing on topical affairs, however, the Eastern experts found themselves seriously hampered by a lack of official guidance indicating the party line which they should follow. Writers like G. B. Erenburg and E. M. Zhukov, on the Far East, V. B. Lutzki, A. F. Miller and L. Vatolina, on the Middle East, I. M. Reisner, A. M. Dyakov and A. A. Guber, on Southeast Asia, had been in the field long enough to harbor vivid recollections of the fate which had befallen their teachers in the Great Purge. Small wonder that none of them was anxious to venture out on a limb by being too outspoken.

Some ideological guidance, it is true, had been given by Andrei Zhdanov, late member of the party Politburo, in 1947. At that time, Yevgeni Varga, the well-known Soviet economist, had been upbraided for voicing—among other things—the "preposterous" idea that Indian independence constituted a new political fact of real importance, which meant a basic change in international relations. "No change whatever" had been the official pronouncement then.

After Stalin's death, however, this line became progressively more anomalous as both the Soviet Union and Communist China began assiduously wooing India and other Asian countries. Soviet writers consequently took care to avoid offensive references to heads of state such as Prime Minister Nehru of India and President Soekarno of Indonesia; but otherwise their attitude toward leaders of the national movements in non-Communist Eastern countries remained decidedly unfriendly.

Thus, for example, the long-standing condemnation of Gandhi as an enemy of the class struggle and mass revolution continued through the first part of 1955. Volume I of the *Most Modern History of the Countries of the Foreign East*, referred to above, repeatedly denounced him as a traitor to the national cause and even went so far as to describe Nehru's father as a most unsavory character, though it refrained from criticizing Nehru himself.[17] On India Varga, too, showed signs of having digested the lesson of 1947. In a book published in the winter of 1953–54, he accused Indian socialist leaders (including the left-wing leader, Dr. Lohya) of being paid American spies, even mentioning the sums allegedly paid to them for their services.[18]

Views expressed with regard to the Middle East followed the same pattern. Abdul Nasser's regime was strongly attacked as "anti-democratic" and "anti-patriotic" because of its agreement with Britain in July 1954 regarding Suez.[19] The Muslim Brothers were denounced as imperialist tools despite the fact that the Egyptian Communists regarded them as allies.[20]

The case against an over-indulgent appraisal of the Eastern national movements was put most succinctly, perhaps, by V. V. Balabushevich, writing on India. It had been quite wrong, he said, to consider the leftist heads of the Indian Congress in the 1930's, *i. e.*, Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose, as the real leaders of the leftist lower middle class and of the national revolutionary movement. Time and realities

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[15] *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, No. 1, 1955, p. 6.

[16] For Smirnov book, see footnote 7.

[17] *Most Modern History of the Countries of the Foreign East*, Moscow University, 1954. p. 172.

[18] Yevgeni Varga, *Izmenii v Ekonomike Kapitalizma v Itoge Vtoroi Mirovoi Voine* (Changes in the Capitalist Economy Resulting from World War II), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1946. (See chapter on India.)

[19] L. Vatolina, *Imperialisticheskaia Borba za Afriku* (Imperialist Struggle for Africa), Soviet Academy of Sciences, 1954. p. 125. Also see *Narody Afriki*, same publisher, 1954. pp. 207–13.

[20] Smirnov, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

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have helped to correct these mistaken notions, he added, acknowledging that he, too, had been guilty of too charitable a view in this regard.[21]

Post-Bandung Reversal

THE persistence of the unfriendly line in Soviet Oriental studies may have been in conformity with the theory and past interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, but it certainly was far from conforming to the practical exigencies of Soviet foreign policy in 1954–55. The Bandung Conference of Asian-African Nations in April 1955 seemingly brought home the realization of this contradiction, for it was swiftly followed by ideological modifications of far-reaching importance.

The new reversal of the party line was heralded by an unsigned editorial published in the May issue of the CPSU theoretical organ, *Kommunist*. The editorial prefaced its discussion of policy by emphasizing that the growing importance of the Asian and African countries made a further expansion of Soviet Eastern studies absolutely imperative. It complained further that the scant attention given to Oriental history and culture in the curricula of Soviet secondary schools and universities imposed a serious limitation on the development of needed Eastern experts. The editorial continued:

Serious mistakes have occasionally been committed in appraising the role of the national bourgeoisie of the countries of the East in the anti-imperialist movement. The progressive features of the struggle of Kemal [Ataturk] and the Kemalists in the fight against imperialism in the 1920's have been ignored. Also, in surveying the role of Gandhi in the anti-imperialist struggle, our Orientalists have not always taken as their point of departure the concrete historical circumstances in India itself.[22]

The fraternity of Eastern experts was taxed in this connection with disregarding Lenin's observation that, in the bourgeois national movement of oppressed nations, there is always some "general democratic content which is unconditionally supported by communism." [23] However, since quotations to the contrary can just as easily be found in Lenin's, and especially Stalin's, writings, it is fairly obvious that the real error of the Orientalists lay in disregarding, not the circumstances of 1925 in the Eastern countries, but the exigencies of Soviet policy in the world situation of 1955.

The new approach obviously has far-reaching implications for Soviet Orientalogy. It means, in effect, that the whole recent history of the East has to be rewritten. To take India as an example, it means that Gandhi, denounced as a traitor in Volume I of the *Most Modern History of the Countries of the Foreign East*, will have to be elevated, in later volumes yet to be published, to the role of patriot.

This rewriting of history, indeed, was begun without delay. The occasion was Prime Minister Nehru's visit to Moscow in June 1955, and those chosen for the task were, certainly not by pure coincidence, Balabushevich and Dyakov, the main culprits in the anti-Gandhi and anti-Congress campaign of the past. Jointly reviewing Nehru's book, *Discovery of India* (just published in Russian translation) in *Kommunist*, Balabushevich and Dyakov cited with evident approbation Nehru's affirmations that Gandhi's activities were the turning point of the Indian national liberation movement; that Gandhi deeply studied and understood the masses, spoke in a language which they understood, and thus was able to awaken and spur them on in the struggle for freedom.[24]

The new Orientalist journal, *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, also adjusted itself, though apparently somewhat half-heartedly, to the revised party line. A leading article in the second issue expressly acknowledged, for the first time, that it was the determined efforts of the national liberation movements which had wrung independence from the imperialist powers for such Asian countries as India, Burma, and Indonesia. Curiously enough, this implied admission that they had attained national sovereignty quite independently of Leninist doctrine was couched in an editorial on the importance of Lenin's ideas.[25]

There are as yet only a few documents which sketch out the broad ideological outline to which Soviet studies will be expected to adhere in the new phase of Kremlin Eastern strategy. One is a highly illuminating article which appeared in the August 1955 (No. 9) issue of *Kommunist* under the title "Novaia Azia" (New Asia). In it non-Communist Asia, excluding the few remaining colonies, is divided into "independent countries"—India, Burma, Indonesia—and countries described as only "formally independent", such as Pakistan, Turkey and the Philippines. The position of foreign capital is acknowledged to be still

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[21] Balabushevich's views were expressed in a study of relations between the working class and the nationalist movement in India, 1923–27, published in *Learned Papers of the Institute of Eastern Studies*, No. 10, 1954. p. 46.

[22] "Za Dalneishyi podyom Sovetskovo Vostokovedeniia" (For a Further Upsurge in Soviet Eastern Studies), *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1955, pp. 74–83.

[23] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (4th Edition), Moscow, Vol. XX, p. 384.

[24] *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1955. p. 103.

[25] *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, No. 2, 1955.

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strong in the "independent" group owing to "specific historical conditions," but it is suggested that they, too, may somehow be able to free themselves from Western economic tutelage.

The "formally independent" (that is, dependent) countries are treated with sorrow rather than with anger. Their "militarization" is deprecated as quite unnecessary because nobody threatens them. Time and again, the Asian peoples as a whole are pictured as "desiring to achieve one and the same goal—to guarantee their national independence and peaceful development, and to realize a decisive improvement of their living standards and a renaissance of their old cultures."

The old basic division between Communist and non-Communist countries is glossed over. In the latter, the once-abhorred landowners are now acknowledged to be by no means all reactionaries; for instance, in Indochina and India, "a considerable proportion of the landowners did not support the colonizers but joined the national movement from the very beginning." Also, "the Communist parties in these countries support all progressive measures taken by the national governments."

From Fifth Column to Loyal Opposition

THE new Communist tactical line of Asian unity in place of Communist exclusivity holds, for the USSR, great advantages which are too obvious to require discussion. But it entails difficulties and dangers as well.

There are the difficulties which it creates for the Communist parties in the non-Communist Asian countries now being courted by the USSR. Hitherto dedicated to the overthrow of the existing governments, these parties now find themselves reduced to the unaccustomed and less rabble-rousing role of a loyal opposition. There are also the difficulties which Soviet Orientalists face in rewriting most of their basic works.

The dangers lurk on the higher international political level. In the past, the Soviet Communists were wont to take a favorable view of most opposition movements in Asia and Africa as long as they remained in opposition; once they attained state power, they became constructivists and hence political enemies. From now on, however, the constructivists, too, are to be treated as friends—misguided, perhaps, but not lost to salvation.

In all this, there is the distinct danger, for the Soviet Union, that the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa will prove really assiduous in pursuing independent policies; that they will try to play the USSR and the West against each other for their own interest—seeking "a rapprochement with the Soviet Union merely to strengthen their own position," the same accusation that was directed against Chiang Kai-shek and other Eastern nationalist leaders by Comintern writers in the early 1930's.[26] This may be a calculated risk, but a risk it remains.

There are other risks and danger inherent in the new Soviet course, and it will be interesting to see how the re-energized Eastern experts of the USSR propose to exorcise them. Their fifteen-year hibernation had its advantages, for they thus avoided the necessity of taking sides on all kinds of ticklish international issues. Now a new period has dawned, in which they will have to shoulder heavy responsibilities. They will have to walk the swaying tightrope of the new party line—ever mindful of what may befall them, as it befell their predecessors, should there be a sudden shift in the Soviet political wind.

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[26] See footnote 12.

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Trade Unions in Mao's China

By H. ARTHUR STEINER

CONTROL of the labor force is a *sine qua non* of the present-day Communist state. With rapid industrialization as its major goal, the Chinese Communist regime has imposed on its working population one of the most rigid sets of controls ever devised by a dictatorial system. Industrial labor has been harnessed to the point where it can be manipulated to serve the political and economic purposes of the state and the party. Intensive indoctrination has been employed to establish in the workers' minds a "correct Communist attitude toward labor." Disciplinary pressures to speed up production and improve its quality are aggressively applied.

The principal instrument for these purposes is the elaborate, party-controlled trade union apparatus. Trade unions in the People's Republic of China (CPR) are officially defined as "mass organizations of all manual and non-manual workers living entirely or mainly on their wages"; and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is designated as "the supreme leading body of the trade unions." [1] The total membership of the Communist-controlled trade unions has reportedly increased from 800,000 in 1945 to 12,450,000 in 1955, more than trebling since the establishment of the CPR in 1949.[2] The continuation of present trends would produce about 14,000,000 trade union members by the end of 1957 out of an estimated total working force of 16,150,000.[3]

ACFTU membership includes, in addition to manual workers in the 23 principal industries, various staff employes—clerks, custodians, stenographers, typists and lower-level management personnel. The "proletariat" in Communist China would therefore be substantially smaller than the 12,450,000 membership in the trade unions. On the other hand, although the ACFTU often speaks for "the Chinese working class," many actual working-class elements are excluded from membership; (1) peasants and (2) small handicraftsmen, because they are not paid in wages; (3) handicraft workers, because "handicrafts are different from modern industry"; and (4) certain professional workers, because they are "non-working-class elements." [4] This somewhat inconsistent pattern shows that the ACFTU is a special form of "mass organization" for those particular elements of the Chinese working class which play a critical role in the industrial policies of "the period of transition to socialism."

Needed: A Doctrine for the "Working Class"

AS a mass organization, the ACFTU seeks a large membership and sets minimal standards for admission; it is thus distinguished from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which safeguards its own distinctive character as the highly disciplined, elitist "organized vanguard of the Chinese working class." The actual number of CCP members in the ranks of the ACFTU is surprisingly small. At the end of 1952, for example, when the CCP had some 6,250,000 members and the ACFTU a membership of about 10,200,000, the ACFTU included only 450,000 CCP members.[5] Not more than 7.2 percent of the CCP membership could then claim a direct affiliation with wage-earning workers; and only 4.4 percent of the

[1] Constitution of the Trade Unions of the CPR (May 10, 1953), Preamble and Article 12, published in *The Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions*, Peiping, Foreign Language Press, 1953, pp. 127–141; also Hsü Chih-chen, "Report on the Amendment to the Constitution of the Trade Unions of the CPR" (May 3, 1953), hereafter cited as Hsü, "Report," *ibid.*, pp. 85–86.

Prior to May 1953, the Chinese name of the organization was customarily translated as "All-China Federation of Labor" (ACFL); thereafter, "All-China Federation of Trade Unions" (ACFTU) became the preferred translation. In this study, "ACFTU" is uniformly used as the English abbreviation of the organization.

[2] Figures from *Hsin-hua jih-pao* (New China Daily), Chungking, March 20, 1945; the annual report of the ACFTU, May 1, 1950, as translated in *Current Background*, Hong Kong, No. 24, p. 3 (hereafter cited as CB); Lai Jo-yü, in *Kung-jen jih-pao* (Daily Worker), Peiping, April 30, 1955, (hereafter cited as *Daily Worker*); and the New China News Agency's *Daily News Release*, Peiping, May 1955, p. 9 (hereafter cited as NCNA and DNR).

[3] This calculation is computed approximately on the data given in Li Fu-ch'ün's report on the First Five-Year Plan to the National People's Congress, July 5–6, 1955, in CB, No. 335 (entire).

[4] Hsü, "Report," pp. 90–91.

[5] Data by Lai Jo-yü, NCNA, Peiping, April 24, 1953, DNR, April 1953, p. 171. Comparable data for later dates have not been released.

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members of the workers' "mass organization" had been admitted into the "organized vanguard of the Chinese working class"! Since most of the CCP members within the ACFTU are concerned with administration and supervision of trade union affairs—as organizers, committee members and cadres in about 200,000 basic trade unions and the heavy administrative superstructures resting upon them—the statistics do not faithfully reflect the number of CCP members in the ACFTU who earn their living through productive activities. Small wonder, then, that the CCP calls itself the "party of the working class" rather than the "party of the proletariat"!

Existing class structures in Chinese society oblige the CCP "theoreticians" to engage in complex doctrinal gymnastics to keep alive the myth of proletarian leadership of a movement so few of whose members are actually proletarian. Official doctrine therefore conceives the "working class" to be comprised of proletarians, peasants, some petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals, handicraftsmen, and "all sections of working people"; at the same time it denies that the CCP is thereby made a party of "worker-peasant alliance." [6] The petty bourgeoisie and peasantry are considered "transitional classes" which will undergo in time a "process of disintegration" and become proletarianized.[7]

Effecting such "proletarianization" among the working people—that is, urban workers and employes—is a primary function of the trade unions. The Communists look upon the ACFTU as "the bridge between the party and the working class"; as such it must

. . . carry out constant education on Marxism-Leninism among the workers, ceaselessly increase the degree of their political consciousness and organization, and bring the initiative and creativeness of workers into full play in the endeavor to raise their productivity.[8]

This formulation embodies three principal themes defining the role of the unions, themes endlessly repeated in policy pronouncements of the mainland regime: (1) The trade union, at the mass organization level, is a specific instrument for the indoctrination and manipulation of workers. (In this respect, it is the labor counterpart of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, *etc.*, and like them is called upon to rally support for any announced purpose or policy of the party and government—whether this be to endorse Chou En-lai's declarations concerning Taiwan or to applaud the administrative reorganizations of Tibet or Sinkiang.) (2) Under party direction, the trade union must indoctrinate the proletariat in Marxist-Leninist mythology concerning the role of labor in a society moving toward socialization. (3) The trade union must contribute to the fulfillment of economic plans by increasing the productivity of workers.

The Preamble to the revised "Constitution of the Trade Unions of the CPR," adopted on May 10, 1953, (see footnote 1), provides some of the currently fashionable metaphors and slogans used to describe the function of the unions:

The trade unions of China led by the Communist Party have rallied the broad masses of the workers around the party and have thus become *transmission belts* between the party and the masses. Since the establishment of the people's democratic dictatorship, the trade unions under the leadership of the party have become a *school of administration,* a *school of management* and a *school of communism* for the workers.

ACFTU Structure and Legal Status

THE formal status of the ACFTU in public law is defined by the Trade Union Law of June 28, 1950, and by several administrative regulations dealing with such subjects as collective labor contracts, labor-capital conciliation procedures and the labor insurance system, which assign specific duties or responsibilities to trade union organizations.[9] In addition, the ACFTU functions under its own constitution and house-law, some features of which are regarded as part of the law of the land.

For the administration of public policy in labor matters, the party and government use two separate structures: (1) the apparatus of the ACFTU, based upon the vertical organizations of 23 industrial unions, which are integrated or coordinated at local, provincial and national levels by various "trade union councils" and the central organs of the ACFTU; and (2) the apparatus of the government's Ministry of Labor, which operates through central organs and a dependent system of provincial and local "labor offices." Both structures are based on the principle of "democratic centralism," which insures that lower-level actions and policies correspond to directives

[6] Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Party*, Peiping, Foreign Language Press, 1950, p. 19. This is the authorized translation of Liu's "Report on the Party Constitution" (June 11, 1945).

[7] Liu, *loc. cit.*

[8] From *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily), Peiping, February 7, 1953 (hereafter cited as *People's Daily*).

[9] *The Trade Union Law and Related Documents*, Chinese People's Publishing House, Peiping, 1953; *The Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China*, Peiping, Foreign Language Press, 1950; *Labor-Capital Relations and Collective Agreements* (Chinese), Canton, Hsin-hua shu-tien, 1950. The Labor Insurance Regulations, in different texts and revisions, may be traced through CB, Nos. 30, 61 and 225.

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issued by the highest level, and hence excludes the possibility of spontaneous expression of unauthorized attitudes by the rank-and-file. Coordination of the ACFTU and Ministry of Labor structures is a function of the CCP itself.

The trade union and government bureaucracies deal with similar aspects of labor, sometimes supplementing or duplicating each other; and in some respects they may be competitive. In general, the Labor Ministry deals with questions of labor supply, wage policy, labor-management, mediation, supervision of collective labor contracts and, until recently, supervision of the administration of labor insurance by the ACFTU. On the other hand, the ACFTU, as the "mass organization" of workers, has political and educational functions as well as the functions of "representing" labor in authorized negotiations with management; it may be said to be concerned chiefly with the management and manipulation of the labor force once it has been recruited, trained and brought to the bench, so that labor discipline will be maintained and labor productivity increased. The weight of both structures falls upon the worker—the proverbial "low man on the totem"—in such a manner that he loses all freedom for job movement (except as permitted by the Labor Ministry bureaucracy) and all freedom for the defense of his job interest (except as the ACFTU bureaucracy finds it useful or convenient to act in his name).

"Closed Shop" Communist-Style

ACCORDING to the 1953 Trade Unions Constitution, union membership is "voluntary." Economic, political and social pressures, however, have the effect of bringing all eligible workers in factories or shops of more than 25 workers into the union system. The worker's job status is determined by a collective agreement concluded for all workers, union or non-union, by the trade union executive; the non-union worker gains no advantage from withholding membership on this score. Management must contribute two percent of its total payroll for *all* workers and employes to the union fund, so that the non-union worker has a kind of investment in the social and educational activities of the trade union but is cut off from the use of libraries and reading rooms, recreational areas and other trade union facilities.[10] More important, the "voluntary" abstention of a worker from the "mass movement" sponsored by the CCP can create political or personal difficulties for him. Furthermore, the Labor Insurance Regulations in force since March 1, 1951, positively discriminate against the non-union worker: in certain situations, he may claim only one-half the amount of benefits payable to a union member [11] (by default, the trade union recaptures the other half for its own use since the mandatory three percent payment from payroll for labor insurance purposes applies to all workers or employes without regard for union membership). Finally, from its own revenues and from insurance fund surplus, the trade union maintains widely-advertised sanatoria, rest-homes, recreation areas, *etc.*, for use by union members. While Communist sources doubtless exaggerate the value or utility of these facilities for the average worker, their existence is probably a marginal factor increasing trade union membership. Considering these several pressures, it is no surprise that most workers take the path of least resistance, forfeiting one percent of their monthly wages for the trade union "admission" fee and dues thereafter.

"Welfare" vs. Anti-"economism"

THE trade unions are enjoined by their constitution "to show constant concern over the improvement of the material and cultural life and the working conditions of the entire body of workers, technical personnel and staff members" (Article 30–b). Such "concern," however, is offset by conditions binding union action. As Liu Shao-ch'i has put it, "the material and cultural life and working conditions of the workers will be improved *step by step* in accordance with the need and *as circumstances permit*," but only "*on the basis of increased production.*" [12] The requirements of production take higher priority than the needs of workers; improvements and the supply of amenities are to be gradual; and nowhere does the suggestion occur that workers should determine "need" or "circumstance." Indeed, trade union cadres who may be preoccupied with welfare projects are subject to sharp criticism. ACFTU Chairman Lai Jo-yü, for example, condemned the unduly rapid expansion of labor insurance programs as "blind adventurism out of proportion to the practical requirements of the masses," warning that "in setting up collective welfare establishments . . . blind adventurism, over-ambitiousness and impractical approaches should be avoided." [13]

[10] Trade Union Law, Article 24.

[11] Labor Insurance Regulations, revised as of January 1, 1953, Article 8, 18; translation in CB, No. 225.

[12] As translated in *People's China*, Peiping, No. 11 (June 1), 1953, Supp., p. 4. Italics supplied.

[13] Lai Jo-yü, "Report on the Trade Union in China," in *The Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions*, pp. 52–53 (hereafter cited as Lai, "Report").

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Liu Shao-ch'i and Lai Jo-yü, in the passages quoted above, were reflecting Communist opposition to "economism" in the tradition of Lenin's policies at the turn of the century.[14] The ACFTU's doctrinal journal recently defined "economism" as follows:

. . . [a deviation] in which improvements in material and cultural life for workers are undertaken without regard for actual increases in levels of productivity; or, when too much emphasis is placed on the provision of comforts and amenities for workers and too little attention is given to conditions of production; or, when wages are increased excessively without regard for actual levels of production; or, when short-term considerations are given higher priority than long-term considerations.[15]

In effect, the campaign against "economism" is an application to the industrial worker of the familiar attack upon "tailism"—the supposed tendency of some party cadres to show a soft attitude toward worker needs and demands. Where the wants of workers can be reasonable satisfied within the established contours of the party line, cadres are instructed to satisfy them; but where the demands of workers are inconsistent with the direction of the party line at a given time, the task of the cadres is to "educate" the worker to appreciate the "irrationality" of his demand for comforts or amenities and to accept the tightened belt as a substitute. The senior ACFTU cadres, who are also CCP comrades or cadres, must try to popularize Spartan-like policies of abstinence and restraint for the working masses at the present, holding them out as the conditions for bounty and abundance in the future.[16]

The party line of placing political considerations above economic considerations stems from the highest authority. As early as December 25, 1947, Mao Tse-tung warned the party Central Committee that an economic policy directed only to the "welfare of the workers" would be a "short-sighted, one-sided policy"—in fact, an "extreme-left, incorrect policy." Believing that that "kind of mistake" had been made during the period of the Chinese Soviet Republic (1931–1934), Mao pointed out that "repetition . . . would necessarily injure the interests of the working masses and of the new democratic state."[17] The urban proletariat was thus placed on warning that it should not read exaggerated promises into the revolutionary action of the CCP.

Mao's dictum became the keynote of propaganda for the following May Day (1948)—when wide publicity was given a special message prepared by Ch'en Po-ta, a member of the Central Committee close to Mao. Following Mao's lead, Ch'en insisted that the requirements of production receive higher priority than the claims of workers to high wages and creature comforts, and defined a "correct wage policy" as one which would "constantly stimulate the production enthusiasm of workers and staff employes." He spoke strongly against "equalitarian" tendencies in wage policy, advocating appropriate upward revision of wage scales for skilled workers according to the actual level of their production. Above all, he condemned "arbitrary, artificial, unprincipled, blind and irrational methods" of raising wages excessively, holding that such methods "could not raise the political consciousness of the working class."[18]

That a "welfare" attitude persists among some workers and cadres despite party exhortation is apparent from Lai Jo-yü's speech to the Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions (May 3, 1953):

The prolonged and persistent existence of this erroneous economist tendency is primarily due to an apolitical tendency in trade union work. The political and ideological leadership of many trade union organizations is weak, failing to carry out consistent and practical Communist education among the workers. Once there is a deviation from Communist ideology, the working-class movement will inevitably move toward economism.[19]

On the other hand, the trade union cadre is told that his failure to give suitable attention to the welfare of workers will lead to condemnation for violating the infallible "mass-line" of the party![20] Beset by the pitfalls of "right" or "left" deviations, the trade union bureaucrat moves slowly and indecisively where worker amenities are concerned; the general temper of anti-"economist" propaganda makes it safer for the bureaucrat to spend his time thinking

[14] In the early 1900's Lenin attacked a trend in the Russian labor movement known as "economism," defined as the attitude of those subordinated political aims to the struggle for economic betterment—higher wages, fewer working hours, improved sanitary conditions in factories, *etc.* Lenin held that such activity would divert workers from the primary task of struggling for the overthrow of Tsarism.

[15] Wang Yung, "Trade Unions Must Give Attention to and Be Concerned with Wage Problems," *Kung-jen* (Worker), Peiping, No. 9 (May 12), 1955.

[16] Li Fu-ch'ün, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, developed this theme in his report on the First Five-Year Plan, July 5–6, 1955. See CB, No. 335, p. 46.

[17] *The Present Situation and Our Tasks*, (Chin.) Hong Kong, 1948, p. 12.

[18] Ch'en Po-ta, "Labor and Tax Policy for Developing Industry," May 1, 1948.

[19] Lai, "Report," pp. 66–67.

[20] Liu Ning-i, "Address to the Fifth Congress of the Tientsin Federation of Trade Unions," *Daily Worker*, Feb. 2, 1955; translated in *Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press*, Hong Kong, No. 989, pp. 23–6 (hereafter referred to as SCMP).

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about the margins of personal safety than in acting affirmatively to obtain a better break for the trade union rank-and-file.

Labor Discipline

COMMUNIST doctrine preaches that the worker has an innate attitude toward labor that distinguishes the society which he assertedly dominates from the bourgeois society which exploits him. *Daily Worker* of January 16, 1955, expressed this teaching in typical fashion:

The Chinese working class [embodies] special characteristics possessed by no other classes in the country; unselfishness, organization, discipline, revolutionary determination, thoroughness, unity and friendly spirit.[21]

Evidently the Chinese worker has not been acting upon the implications of this doctrine, in spite of persistent efforts of the ACFTU to "educate and influence" him in the spirit of communism. First among the duties of a trade union member, according to the Constitution of the Trade Unions, is the observance of "laws and decrees of the state and labor discipline" (concurrently, he is enjoined to "take good care of public property" and to raise his "class consciousness and working ability"). Yet on July 10, 1953, the Presidium of the new Seventh Executive Committee of the ACFTU noted the prevalence of such breaches of labor discipline as "absenteeism, leave without valid reason, work evasion, slow-down, disobedience in assignments and transfers, and non-observance of working rules and safety measures," and directed "trade unions at all levels to take the consolidation of labor discipline as their regular important duty." [22] Trade unions were to establish indoctrination schemes and, among other things, to employ "emulation campaigns" as devices for tightening labor discipline. In cases where persuasion failed to produce results, "recalcitrant elements constantly committing serious acts of breach of labor discipline should be properly punished."

Thus the groundwork was laid for the enactment of "The Outline of Labor Regulations for State Operated Enterprises," surely an astonishing revelation of the exploitive role of trade unions. The Outline was drafted in the higher echelons of the ACFTU, and was presented to the Government Administration Council on May 6, 1954, by Lai Jo-yü with a recommendation for their adoption. The Outline was enacted the same day.[23] While the enacting process exemplifies the official status of the

[21] "Promote the Internal Unity of the Working Class." (Chin.)
[22] Reported in *People's Daily*, August 27, 1953.
[23] For text of the Outline, see SCMP, No. 859, 1954.

At a Heavy Industrial Plant *Woodcut by Yen Han*

"JOY THROUGH LABOR" A LA MAO

—From *People's China*, Peiping, Foreign Languages Press, May 1, 1953.

ACFTU, the Regulations themselves exemplify the nature of the Chinese Communist conspiracy against the Chinese working class.

The stated purpose of the Labor Regulations is "to ensure and consolidate labor discipline, correctly organize labor, fully and rationally use working hours, raise labor productivity and turn out quality products." Strict observance of the Regulations was enjoined on all workers as their "sacred duty." Seven "basic duties" of workers and staff members are defined principally as specific obligations of "labor discipline" (Article 8). Seven "basic duties" of management are also listed, including the "tightening of labor discipline"—this in Regulations drafted by trade union cadres! Ten of the 24 articles deal with punitive procedures; they authorize management to impose penalties administratively and to refer "serious cases" to the people's courts. Indeed, management is compelled to enforce such penalties or suffer punishment itself:

Workers and staff members, when proved to be in error by the management, shall be punished immediately . . . .

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Penalties shall be meted out to responsible administrative personnel failing to impose penalties within the [set] time limit. (Article 18).

The worker charged with a breach of labor discipline has a limited right of explanation, but nowhere do the Regulations even infer that workers may appeal through the trade union system or expect trade union cadres to intercede on their behalf. On the contrary: the Regulations imply that trade unionists should search out violations of labor discipline, report them to management, and then prosecute management for failure to punish workers. Although applicable directly to state-operated enterprises, the Regulations may be adapted to the maintenance of labor discipline in joint state-private or wholly private enterprises.

As in other instances, the trade union cadres soon found themselves caught in an ideological crossfire. *People's Daily* (October 22, 1954) noted "increasing breaches of labor discipline," and emphasized the need for a "firm attitude" to insure the punishment of offenders.[24] But *Daily Worker* (January 21, 1955) observed that "punishment of workers has become the principal method for consolidating labor discipline," and instructed trade union cadres to avoid "punitivism" while also avoiding the contrary evil of "tailism." The worker remained under the whip.

"Comrade workers' courts" (*t'ung-chih shen-p'an hui*), attached to the system of people's courts, have also been instituted to enforce labor discipline. The Communist press has featured the general "educational" benefits reported in the experience of 70 such courts established in state-owned industries up to June 1954. The trial of 33 workers and employes in the Anshan Iron and Steel Company during 15 proceedings in 1953 had the asserted effect of reducing absenteeism in a section-group of the Anshan plant from 20 percent to 1.2 percent.[25] Although *People's Daily* described "comrade workers' courts" as "mass organizations of workers for self-education," this description was belied by the suggestion that the courts ought to be composed of more ordinary workers than trade union officials.[26] The suggestion was also made that the "comrade workers' courts" might modify the punitive aspects of their practice by restricting their deliberations to cases presented to them by the administration of the enterprise.

[24] Translated in SCMP, No. 922, pp. 17–25.

[25] *People's Daily*, June 5, 1954, in SCMP, No. 836, p. 17.

[26] Sze Hsuan, "Points To Be Borne in Mind When Establishing Comrade Workers' Courts," *People's Daily*, June 5, 1954, translated in SCMP, No. 836, pp. 18–20.

Labor Emulation

Trade union programs for stimulating an increase in labor productivity have centered not only on "the strengthening of labor discipline" but also on "the development of labor emulation." The latter term is a Marxist-Leninist equivalent for "labor speed-up," generally looked upon by the free trade unions of the West as a device used by unscrupulous management to overwork labor. Communist trade unions take an opposite point of view. The development of production, according to Lai Jo-yü, is "the most important task of the trade unions, and:

The fundamental method of the trade unions in developing production is to lead the masses step by step to take part in labor emulation; and, through emulation drives, to develop to the highest degree the activity and creative initiative of the workers, technical personnel, and other employes: to improve labor organization, production processes, equipment and methods of operating machinery, and thus to raise labor productivity . . . .

The general process of development of labor emulation is from shock work to regular methods of work, from a low to a high level. It is the process of continuously raising the ideological consciousness and technical level of the masses, and is also the process of raising the backward elements in production to the level of the advanced.[27]

The Chinese Communist concept of "labor emulation" is closely related to that of "socialist emulation" in the Soviet Union. Lai Jo-yü has invoked Stalin as an authority to describe the "radical revolution" that emulation brings "to men's views of labor, for it transforms labor from a degrading and painful burden, as it was regarded before, into a matter of honor, a matter of glory, of valor and heroism [sic]."[28] The January 27, 1954, directive of the ACFTU Executive Committee on labor emulation cited Stalin on the use of the "emulation drive" as "a Communist method by which millions of the laboring masses work with the greatest enthusiasm to build socialism."[29] These quotes reveal the dual purpose of labor "emulation" in the Communist view: while its concrete aim is to increase production, it is also considered an important means for "awakening the political consciousness" of the Chinese worker and for inculcating in him a "correct Communist labor attitude." In a sense, therefore, labor emulation is used as a method to reorient the urban worker toward official doctrines of society and production relations, as "reform through labor" (*i.e.*, forced labor) has been employed to reeducate other classes of

[27] Lai, "Report," pp. 56–57.

[28] Translated in SCMP, No. 922, pp. 17–25.

[29] *People's Daily*, April 11, 1954, translated in SCMP, No. 794, pp. 36–39.

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Chinese society. In the end, the post-Marxian "historical materialists" seek to evoke greater productivity from the worker by appealing to his loyalties to "state" and "class" rather than by appealing to his pocketbook and self-interest.

According to Lai, 683,000 workers took part in emulation drives in 1950; 2,380,000 in 1951; and 2,830,000 in 1952.[30] By 1953, the "emulation drive" had become a normal method for meeting the production schedules of the First Five-Year Plan. On January 27, 1954, the ACFTU Executive Committee directed that emulation drives no longer be based on spontaneous effort but be "organized and planned"; only thus could the drives "become a regular, permanent form of labor as distinguished from 'shock' labor." The trade unions were instructed to "raise the level of leadership over such drives" and to "work hand in hand with the management and organize emulation drives in a practical manner." [31] Emulation techniques and objectives are now written into "collective labor contracts" negotiated by trade union cadres with managements of state and joint state-private enterprises; in some cases, they are written into contracts with private enterprise.[32]

The ACFTU has embarked upon indoctrination programs designed to "help workers and staff members overcome their difficulties and dispel their ideological misgivings" about various speed-up and rationalization measures.[33] To elicit rationalization suggestions from workers, the ACFTU proposed to the government Administration Council a scheme of financial awards, up to the equivalent of US $20,000, which was adopted by the Council on May 6, 1954.[34] In the past year hardly a day has passed without some reference to "emulation," or some patriotic or financial incitement to "struggle" to surpass production norms and planning objectives.

Final Estimate

TO sum up what has been said, the labor scene in Communist China presents a sorry view of the lot of the workingman under Mao's regime. In state-operated enterprises, workers have become pawns to be manipulated by management, government labor offices and the ACFTU according to the political-economic objectives of the regime as fixed by the CCP. In joint state-private enterprises, the ACFTU works hand-in-glove with the state-designated management to achieve, in time, the exclusion or absorption of the private share. Spontaneous expressions of interest by individual workers are completely proscribed (except when worker complaints can be employed in the "criticism and self-criticism" of ACFTU cadres).

In short, the "labor movement" in Communist China has lost any resemblance to the free world concept of a workers' organization seeking economic betterment for its members; it is clearly and simply a tool of the Chinese Communists for the manipulation of labor to their own ends.

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[30] Combined from CB, No. 220, p. 20, and NCNA, Peiping, April 24, 1953.

[31] See note 29.

[32] "Trade Union Work and the Transformation of Capitalist Industry," editorial in *Ta Kung pao*, Tientsin, Dec. 22, 1954, translated in SCMP, No. 963; and Liu Shao-p'ing, "Important Tasks of Trade Union Work in State-Capitalist Enterprises," (Chin.), *Hsin-hua yüeh-pao* (New China Monthly) No. 2, February 1955, pp. 36–37.

[33] ACFTU Decision, April 21, 1954; NCNA, Peiping, May 26, 1954, translated in SCMP, No. 821, pp. 35–36.

[34] NCNA, Peiping, August 28, 1954, DNR, August 1954, p. 329; also, Lai Jo-yu, "On some Problems of Labor Emulation," *New China Monthly*, No. 7 (July), 1955, pp. 71–73.

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Albania: A Communist Colony

By DANIEL NORMAN

TWO centuries ago Edward Gibbon, the English historian, described Albania as a country within sight of Italy, yet less known than the interior of America. Today this little country is still in large part an unknown quantity. There is virtually no trade between Albania and non-Communist countries, and while an increasing number of tourists have been allowed to enter other areas within the Soviet orbit, the Iron Curtain which surrounds Albania has been opened no more than a chink.

Reliable information about the "country of the eagles,"—as the Albanians have traditionally called their homeland—is thus hard to obtain. Official data concerning the status of the country and its economy are almost never released. Albanian daily newspapers reach the West very irregularly and the so-called official journal of the Albanian Communist Party, the counterpart of *Pravda* in the USSR, has not been on public sale since 1948; today it is virtually impossible for anyone other than members of the party and government hierarchy to obtain copies. As a consequence political and economic studies of the Communist countries have largely ignored this corner of Europe. Even the United Nations' *Economic Survey of Europe*, its *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, and its other specialized publications have been obliged until recently to omit studies of Albania or to base them on the haziest kind of information. At a recent session of the Economic Council for Europe (March 1955), while other Communist delegations were criticizing the "interpretation" of the data they had supplied to the editorial staff of *Economic Survey*, the Albanian delegate merely "regretted that the Survey did not mention the economic development of his country." He "presumed" that the documentation supplied by the Albanian government had "arrived too late." [1]

In many ways Albania has been as remote from the Communist as from the non-Communist world. Since Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet camp in 1948, Albania has been geographically isolated from the satellite bloc. Even Western Communists find it difficult to arrange a trip to Albania. Probably in part as a result of its exposed position, the country has never been accepted as a member of the Cominform. No "treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" of the kind signed between Moscow and her other satellites linked Albania with the Soviet Union until May 1955, when Albania was invited to adhere to the Warsaw Pact. And although it was assigned the dangerous role of "agent provocateur" in the Balkans, precipitating border incidents along the Greek frontier during the Greek Civil War (December 1944–September 1949), and along the Yugoslav frontier between 1948–1954, Albania had no formal guarantee of Soviet military assistance. The Soviet Union knows well that, although the Albanian people have always defended their country valiantly, its vulnerable frontiers leave it open to easy conquest. Left to herself, Albania is indefensible.

[1] UN Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Europe, Tenth Session, *Summary Record of the Seventeenth Meeting* (held at Geneva on March 25, 1955), p. 19.

Mr. Norman, a British writer specializing in Soviet and satellite affairs, is author of *Marx and Soviet Reality*, Batchworth Press Ltd., London, 1955.

Tito: A Guiding Hand

RELATIONS between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) and those of the satellites deteriorated immediately after the CPY was expelled from the Cominform on June 28, 1948. But the bitterness of the exchanges between the CPY and the Communist Party of Albania (CPA) refer little to this dispute; they stem largely from the nature of the interrelationship between the two parties, from the fact that by 1948 the guiding hand of the CPY had reached into every aspect of Albanian life. By 1948 Albania was in the anomalous position of being the satellite of a satellite.

This had been the situation from the very birth of the CPA; indeed the CPY was responsible for its conception. Soon after the German attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941 (Italy had established control over Albania in April 1939), two Yugoslav Communists, Miladin Popovic and Dusan Mugosa, succeeded in welding various factions into a united Albanian Communist Party—largely because they promised to obtain Comintern recognition for the new party. On November 8, 1941 the CPA was formed and a provisional Central Committee was

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chosen under the secretaryship of Enver Hoxha (who remains the top man in the Albanian Communist hierarchy).[2] By the time Mugosa left Albania in May 1942 to report to Tito, Albanian partisan units had already been organized; during 1942 these units repeatedly and successfully attacked Italian installations. Meanwhile, in September 1942 a mass organization, called the National Liberation Movement (NLM) was formed, purportedly to include other groups who were opposed to Italian rule.

In December 1942 Mugosa and Blazo Jovanovic appeared at the First Territorial Conference of the CPA as representatives of the CPY. They informed the CPA of its recognition by the Comintern, and conveyed a letter from Tito with detailed instructions outlining the tactics and procedures the CPA should follow. The news of Comintern recognition was greeted rapturously by the assembled Albanian delegates, and they hastened to follow Tito's advice. Accordingly, the base of the NLM was broadened, formal CPA control of the NLM army was made less obvious, internal discipline in the CPA was tightened and unreliable elements were purged.[3]

Though recognized by the Comintern, the CPA was not itself a member; the CPY thus continued to be the middle man in conveying Comintern instructions to the CPA, a factor which helped cement the ties between the parties. In its role as foster child of the CPY, the CPA also became a firm supporter of many of Tito's policies. For example, at a Conference of the National Liberation Front, held at Berat in November 1944, Koçi Xoxe, then Enver Hoxha's deputy, recommended the adoption of a postwar policy favoring "a Balkan confederation and even something more than a confederation," a keystone of Yugoslavia's foreign policy until 1948.[4] Needless to say, on April 28, 1945 Yugoslavia became the first country to establish diplomatic relations with the new Albanian People's Republic (proclaimed November 29, 1944) and a program of economic and military aid was begun.

The economic plans of the countries were coordinated, a customs union was established, their currencies equalized, and joint-stock companies were set up. Such companies differed from those linking the USSR and its other satellites in that they benefited the weaker partner, Albania, by guaranteeing the delivery of Yugoslav goods and currency. Hundreds of Yugoslav military and civil experts went to Albania—one of their achievements there was the construction of the first railroad in the country. Whereas Moscow's contribution during the period preceding the quarrel with Tito consisted in a "modest loan" offered in 1947 when Enver Hoxha first visited the Soviet capital, aid from Yugoslavia constituted almost 57 percent of the Albanian budget in 1947 and almost 50 percent in 1948. At the opening of the People's Assembly on July 19, 1947 Enver Hoxha declared that "the alliance with Yugoslavia represents our glorious past and our common future. . . . It is the cornerstone of the safeguarding of peace in the world." And only a few weeks before the Cominform resolution which excommunicated the CPY in June 1948, Hoxha was still promising to continue to "strengthen and cement" the "precious ties with Yugoslavia."[5] A mark of the extent to which these "ties" had been carried by 1948 is the fact that 27 of the 46 treaties, agreements, conventions and protocols with Yugoslavia broken by the USSR and her satellites after Tito's fall from grace were signed by Albania.

Exit Tito, Enter Stalin

AFTER the June 1948 Cominform resolution expelling the CPY from the brotherhood of Communist nations, Enver Hoxha acted quickly and unequivocally to align the CPA on the side of the CPSU. That he could do so with full confidence in his success was due to a complex of factors. In the first place, though Yugoslav aid was undeniably crucial in the birth of the CPA and in creating and stabilizing the Albanian People's Republic, a number of CPA leaders resented the dominant role the CPY had assumed and feared even further Yugoslav penetration into Albanian affairs. This faction of the party was also irreconcilably opposed to Yugoslavia's continuing domination over the Kosovo area, Albania's *territoria irredenta*. Soviet control seemed

[2] "History of the Albanian Communist Party—I," *News From Behind the Iron Curtain*, Vol. 4, No. 11 (November, 1955), pp. 8-10. The committee consisted also of Qemal Stafa, Ymer Dishnica, Ramadan Citaku, Koçi Xoxe, Nako Spiro, Kristo Themelko, Tuk Jakova, Liri Gega, Bedriu Spahiu, and Kandri Hoxha. (*Ibid.*, p. 10.) See also Vladimir Dedijer, *Il Sangue Tradito: Relazioni Jugoslavo-Albanesi, 1938–1949* (Varese: Editoriale Periodici Italiana, 1949) and *La République Populaire d'Albanie* (La Documentation Française, Notes et Etudes Documentaires, Nos. 1843–5, Paris, 1954). The latter reproduces in their entirety the texts of the Albanian Constitution, the Model Statutes of collective farms and many other official documents.

[3] "History of the Albanian Communist Party—II," *News From Behind the Iron Curtain*, Vol. 5, No. 1, (January, 1956), pp. 22–3.

[4] Quoted by François Fejtö in *Histoire des Démocraties Populaires*. Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1952, p. 239.

[5] *White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania towards Yugoslavia.* Belgrade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Yugoslav People's Republic, 1951, pp. 164–5.

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to them much less immediately pressing and much less of a galling threat to their national existence. Stalin catered to these feelings by offering the dream of a "great Albania" which would "incorporate" Yugoslav territory.[6]

It can be assumed, furthermore, that the loyalties of CPA members to the CPSU, as ideological arbiter of the Communist world, made their rejection of the CPY easier, though this is a rather difficult matter to evaluate quantitatively. We are certain, however, that Mehmet Shehu, a rival of Hoxha's since 1944, was the leader of a considerable Stalinist faction in the CPA. As Shehu moved to extend his power position, Hoxha, a past master of the art of self-preservation in political intrigues, moved even faster. Himself rather cordial toward Yugoslavia, Hoxha seized the opportunity to solidify his personal hold on the CPA by identifying Koçi Xoxe, until then ostensibly his trusted lieutenant and right-hand man, with the "pro-Yugoslav" elements in the CPA.

Little information is available on the Ninth and Tenth Plenums of the CPA Central Committee, held immediately after the break with Tito, and thus the exact manner in which Hoxha proceeded to eliminate Xoxe is unknown. Apparently, however, the method was the one generally favored by Communists in scapegoat purges: that of gradual demotion and deprivation of powers followed by purging. At first Xoxe was removed from his post as Minister of Industry, and as a partial balm one of Xoxe's supporters became the new Minister of the Interior; but after the Eleventh Plenum in September 1948 deprived Xoxe of his party post as Secretary of Cadres, Hoxha felt secure enough (or was he forced?) to invite Mehmet Shehu to take over the Ministry of Interior and proceed with the purge in earnest. By November 1948, when the First Congress of the CPA was held, Xoxe and his closest friend, Pandi Kristo, until then President of the State Control Commission, had lost all their positions.[7] On November 9, 1948, Xoxe was arrested. His trial, the first of a series of spectacular "Titoist" trials that rocked the satellites in succeeding months, began on May 12, 1949; he was sentenced to death on June 11 and hanged the same day. According to some sources, the trial touched off pitched battles between the army and a contingent of party men still loyal to Xoxe, but the latter group was soon forced to capitulate. Some retired to the mountains, some crossed into Yugoslavia, the rest were arrested and sent to prison.[8] In subsequent months the ranks of the Workers' Party were subjected to a thorough weeding.[9]

[6] Tuk Jakova in *Zeri i Popullet*, September 25, 1949. By the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest Serbia annexed the district around Kosovo, where the population is two-thirds Albanian. In August 1941 Kosovo was annexed by Italian-controlled Albania, but in April 1945 Tito declared the area a part of Yugoslavia and on September 3, 1945, the People's Assembly of the Serbian People's Republic voted to create the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija. Other Yugoslav areas with many Albanians are the regions near Tetovo and near Skopje. The growth of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia, according to official censuses, is: 1921—439,657; 1931—505,259; 1948—750,431; 1953—752,000.

[7] At this congress the CPA also changed its name to the Albanian Workers' Party, to conform with the pattern established in the other satellites.

Economic Progress—Soviet Style

UNTIL the break between the CPY and the Cominform the Soviet Union had been an insignificant factor in Albanian political life, and the CPSU had played only an indirect role in the affairs of the CPA, relaying its views through the CPY. During the war Moscow had neither direct contact with the Albanian Communists nor any liaison with the Albanian resistance movement. No Soviet soldiers had been on Albanian soil during the war. Soviet recognition of the Hoxha government was not forthcoming until November 1945, and the first Soviet diplomat did not arrive in Tirana until 1946.

After the break with the CPY, and as long as the Greek civil war continued (December 1944-September 1949), Soviet shipments of armaments and food reached Albanian ports regularly because Albanian territory was the only place to which the Greek Communist rebels could retreat to remuster for

[8] *Il Sangue Tradito*, pp. 95–7; *La République Populaire d'Albanie*, No. 1843, p. 10.

[9] In a speech reported in *For A Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, April 11–17, 1952, Enver Hoxha stated that 5,996 party members had been expelled between the First Party Congress and the end of 1951. He placed the total membership of the party at 44,418, including new recruits.

"SEPARATE PATHS TO SOCIALISM"?

The Albanian Workers' Party and all Albanian people have asked our delegation to convey to the Twentieth Congress of the glorious CPSU and the fraternal Soviet people their warmest revolutionary greeting . . . . The CPSU is our own mother, who is teaching us to live; it is a beacon to Communist and workers' parties of the whole world, as is the light of the sun, and we hold dear our affection for Lenin's great party. Our people will be eternally grateful for the great assistance given our country by our dear Soviet comrades.

—Address by Enver Hoxha at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Radio Moscow, February 20, 1956.

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attack.[10] While these shipments were mainly for the use of the Greek troops, a little of the food was allocated to the Albanian population. With the cessation of hostilities in Greece, however, Soviet aid was cut off almost entirely. The critical shortage of food, severely aggravated by the termination of Yugoslav shipments of grain, forced Hoxha in 1949 to tighten the already harsh rationing system; a large part of the population, including the majority of the peasantry, was denied ration tickets. A revealing comment in the official French language propaganda newspaper *L'Albanie Nouvelle* rationalized Hoxha's move thusly: "The former system was unjust, for it provided *everybody* with food and clothing tickets . . ." [11]

While refusing material aid of any substance, Moscow moved quickly to impose a system of thoroughgoing planning on the Albanian economy.[12] If the Soviet economic plan for Albania spared it some of the torments of forced industrialization visited on the other satellites, Moscow was acting not out of concern for the Albanian people but on the basis of a closely-figured estimate of profit and loss to the Soviet exchequer. Three factors seem to have been determinate. Firstly, Albania was so backward industrially that it would take tremendous sums of money to secure substantial returns from capital investment. Then, too, planners had to consider the cost and time involved in shipping goods to and from Albania by freighter. Lastly, shipping lanes, and even Albania herself, were indefensible in the event of military hostilities.

Soviet economic policy in Albania, therefore, was based on the need to obtain relatively short-term returns. While the Five-Year Plan (1951–1955) called for considerable heavy industry, the primary stress was placed on extractive industries, consumer goods industries, and the agricultural sector. Raw materials were earmarked largely for Soviet and satellite factories; and it was expected that a rise in consumer goods and agricultural production, the latter to result from increased collectivization, would ensure a happy working people, reduce Albania's need for imports of these items, and minimize its demands on the Soviet Union and the other satellites for help in correcting its annual imbalance of payments.[13] This was the plan—no part of it has been successfully fulfilled.[14]

Industrialization in Albania was not forced, but the Five-Year Plan called for an annual expansion rate of 27.7 percent, and upward revisions during the first three years of the Plan changed the scheduled increase to around 30 percent. Although the rate of increase during the first year of the Plan was reported to be 47.1 percent, the fulfilled rate decreased every year thereafter, until in 1954 the budget announcement contained provisions for an increase of only 14.7 percent. Other published Albanian statistics indicate a certain amount of success in industrialization, but such data are gross figures, including probably much processing. Furthermore, mining and handicrafts have been included as industrial enterprises, and these were, as indicated above, the high-priority sectors of the economy. A true indication of the extent of Albanian industrialization is the fact that 70 percent of the Albanian population is still employed in agriculture, the most neglected sector of the economy.

The examples of the Albanian oil industry will serve to illustrate the imperialist manner in which Soviet-planned "industrialization" is being carried out in Albania. Crude oil production shows the following rate of increase:

TABLE I

Crude Oil Production [15]

[In thousands of tons]

1938	132
1940–44 (average)	250
1947	114
1948	90
1950	132
1953	200
1954	235
1955 (Target in 1950 plan)	263
1955 (Revised target announced at the beginning of 1955)	254

[10] At this time also, the Soviet Union began to send the thousands of civilian and military experts and advisers who are now to be found in every field of Albanian life. It is also certain that through a well-ordered system of responsibility, these men report directly to the present real masters of Albania—Soviet Ambassador L. I. Krylov and the Military Attaché Colonel Alexander Novikov.

[11] No. 20, April 1949. (Author's italics.)

[12] For an excellent analysis of the postwar Albanian economy see "Economic Report: Albania," *News From Behind the Iron Curtain*, Vol. 3, No. 5 (May 1954), pp. 12–22.

[13] For a discussion of the Five-Year Plan see *Ibid.*, pp. 12–16.

[14] Radio Tirana has recently announced the fulfillment of all Five-Year Plan goals except those for light industry and food supply. It is known, however, that in 1953, as part of "the new course," the goals set in 1951 were reduced by an unannounced amount. Thus no exact figures are available on plan "fulfillment," nor are they likely to be published before the May 1956 Congress of the CPA.

[15] The above chart has been assembled from the following sources: *La République Populaire d'Albanie: Dokumentacioni Bilten*, (Belgrade, Institut za Medjunarodnu Politiku i Privredu, 1954), No. 9–9, p. 183; [U. N.] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954*, Geneva, 1955, p. 265; *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Geneva, May 1955, p. 42.

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Thus, it is obvious that the total capacity of Albanian refineries, about 30,000 metric tons, is far below crude oil production or the needs of domestic consumption; and although Radio Tirana announced in June 1952 that a 150,000-ton capacity refinery would be built at Cerrik, a recent broadcast indicated that the plant is still uncompleted. Meantime Albanian oil resources continued to be exploited in blatantly imperialist fashion: Albanian crude oil is shipped to Danzig, Poland, and the Soviet Union, while refined petroleum products must be bought from Rumania.[16]

In short, Albania must sell her raw materials and buy back finished goods. The fact that the Soviet Union makes up the deficit in Albania's balance of international payments does not assure a rise in the standard of living or higher production efforts by the Albanian workers.

Planning in the agricultural sector was based, of course, on the premise of collectivization, and the government resorted both to inducements and to considerable coercion in an attempt to drive the peasants into a system of *kolkhozes*. But, despite heavy and arbitrary taxation, incessant harassments and other forms of pressure, the private peasants clung to their land. The number of collectives grew very slowly: in 1953 only 6 percent of the land in Albania was collectivized, less than in any other satellite.[17] The only undoubted result of the collectivization drive was the destruction of individual peasant initiative, whether in the case of a tightly controlled collective farmer or a harrassed private farmer. The output of livestock products and agricultural crops decreased disastrously. The total of livestock is now somewhat below prewar levels (see Table II), while crop yield is only about equal to the prewar level: for example, the average yield of wheat between 1934 and 1938 was 10.5 quintals per hectare (1 quintal=100 lbs.), in 1950 the yield was only 9.7 q., and the unfulfilled planned yield for 1955 was only 11.5 q. Similarly in the case of rye: the 1934–38 yield was 10.8 q., the 1950 results were 7.4 q., and the unfulfilled planned yield for 1955 was 9 q.[18] Meanwhile the population has increased more than 20 percent, from 1,030,000 in 1937 to 1,246,000 in 1952.[19]

TABLE II

Head of Livestock

	1938	*1946*	*1948*	*1949*	*1950*	*Plan for 1955*
Cattle (incl. water buffalo)	134	140	143	134	129	139
Sheep	1,574	1,835	1,730	1,639	1,707	1,844
Pigs	15	27	22	30	47	127
Goats	932	1,065	847	800	830	847
Oxen	168	142	156	148	149	162
Mules and asses	55	67	68	65	67	124
Horses	54	55	53	50	51	

The above figures, given in thousands of head, have been taken from "Economic Report: Albania," *op. cit.* p. 17. In referring to this chart it should be kept in mind that the 1955 food production plan has not been fulfilled. See note 13, above.

The summer of 1952 brought a scorching drought to Albania; by early 1953 almost all types of food were in short supply and prices were rising. Poor quality black bread was the chief item in the people's diet, while such products as meat, poultry, eggs, butter, olive oil, olives, and vegetables were unobtainable most of the time. Serious inflation was indicated early in 1953 by the appearance of large quantities of new currency bills. The third state loan, launched March 1, 1953, was intended partially to check this trend. A particularly stringent series of agricultural decrees was promulgated on March 19 in an attempt to coerce the peasants into fulfilling the plan.

The "New Course"

THE June 1953 riots in East Germany rocked the Communist world. That such an uprising could occur in the most advanced of the Communist areas made the future of miserable and isolated Albania seem bleak indeed. The Hoxha government, almost undoubtedly acting on orders from Moscow, moved quickly to forestall active popular discontent. On June 23 Radio Tirana announced the first of the "new economic courses" later launched in the other satel-

[16] On February 11, 1956, Radio Tirana announced that Albania had signed an agreement in Moscow to continue such oil shipments for another year.

[17] The following chart shows the development of *kolkhozes* in Albania:

Year	*Number of Cooperatives*	*Area in Hectares*	*Number of Families*	*Percent of land*
1946	7	943	217	0.3
1947	21	3,672	825	1.2
1948	56	10,870	2,442	3.4
1953 (April)	115	21,751	6,291	6.0

(*Data* from *La République Populaire d'Albanie*, No. 854, p. 5.)

[18] "Economic Report: Albania," *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[19] The 1937 population figure has been taken from the [FAO] *Yearbook of Food and Agriculture Statistics—1952*, while the 1952 figure is a UN estimate published in *Population and Vital Statistics Reports* (January 1954).

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
hosteni
VITI XI — Nr. 14 (333) 17 Korrik 1955
ORGAN I KOMITETIT TË GAZETARËVE TË REPUBLIKËS
Nga shkaku i cilësisë së dobët të prodhimit në disa Kooperativa Artizanati janë kthyer mallra shuqe se fiuk i mer konsumatori dhe rikthehen në depo.
I bleve apo i shet?
I shes po s' i ble njeri.

Caption at upper right: Because of poor production in some trade cooperatives, manufactured supplies not accepted by the consumer are returned to the (distributing) depot.

Below: Are you buying or selling?
—I would (like to) sell, but nobody will buy . . .

—From *Hosteni* (The Goad), Tirana, July 17, 1955.

lites as well.[20] As a first step, all debts accumulated by the peasantry between 1949 and 1952 were cancelled. At the same time, the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Procurement were directed to devise steps "to improve the living conditions of the patriotic working peasantry."

On August 1, 1953 Hoxha outlined the "new economic course" for the People's Assembly, stressing planned improvements in agricultural and consumer goods production and relaxation of controls on small-scale private trade. A number of measures were taken to implement the new policy. On September 8 the Council of Ministers passed four decrees formalizing the concessions promised to the peasants: the first provided cancellation of all or part of accumu-

[20] Portents of this move were evident at an agricultural congress held in April 1953. On April 20 Minister of Agricultural Kapo openly stated that the collectives were not working well, and he offered details. On April 21 Prime Minister Hoxha told the congress that the new Soviet rulers (Stalin died March 6, 1953) would continue assistance to Albania, chiefly for the development of the country's agriculture.

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lated income arrears for agricultural cooperatives and their members as well as for private peasants. Another decree reduced prices of certain plows, harrows, and cultivators. The third decree amended certain old laws to lessen interference with purchasing and transportation of agricultural and livestock products, as well as with private trading activities in these commodities. The fourth decision exempted the less fertile land of the individual peasants and the collectives from deliveries of certain crops, including wheat, corn, rye, beans, barley and oats; the decree also reduced deliveries from more fertile land. The decision was retroactive and provided that the peasants would be reimbursed for the crops they had already delivered that year. Several other decrees of a like nature were promulgated later in the year.[21]

Conditions improved somewhat in 1954 and the government was able to resume its collectivization drive. Two new kinds of agricultural collectives—known as collectives of the first and second type—were authorized in 1954. In both types the peasants retain their land, tools and draft animals as their personal property. Other decrees were calculated as incentives to stimulate agricultural production and to form collectives. In May 25, 1955, *Zeri i Popullit* carried an announcement that the Ministry of Agriculture had approved 14 new agricultural collectives, making the total in the country 187 (of which 58 were created in the fall of 1954 and the spring of 1955). This number did not include some 170 agricultural associations of the simple type which were created between December 1954 and May 1955.

Failures and Their Aftermath

NEVERTHELESS, reports reaching the West indicate the complete failure of the "new course." Enver Hoxha reported to the Second Conference of Agricultural Cooperatives that there were cases of brutal beating and exploitation of collective farm members.[22] Party and Machine and Tractor Station (MTS) cadres presented a problem. They had to be convinced, said the party organ *Bashkimi*, that they "could not consider themselves as mere drivers of tractors" but were the "men who carry the party line to the masses in the villages."[23] Party organizers were reminded that they "should persuade the peasants to have their plowing and sowing done by MTS"; the same article reported that there were only 21 MTS in Albania.[24]

One of the most recent agricultural decrees, on "simplification of planning in agriculture," applies to all produce with the exception of industrial crops and rice. According to this decree private farmers, *kolkhozes* and state farms "will do their own planning, basing it on the quantity of agricultural products for delivery and their own needs."[25] Peasant resistance has continued, however, and output of food products has sunk to new lows. In 1955, disastrous famine and pestilence struck Albania.

The reaction to US President Eisenhower's offer of March 4, 1955, to send food through the Red Cross to the Albanian population provides proof of how thoroughly Moscow manipulates the levers in Tirana and also offers an indication of how serious the food shortage was. It was the Soviet press which first announced Hoxha's refusal; the Albanian Telegraphic Agency merely confirmed the word given out by the Kremlin. While dubbing President Eisenhower's statement that a food shortage existed a "huge and devilish slander,"[26] Radio Tirana apparently felt it necessary to placate the Albanian people by announcing the "recent" arrival of a Soviet "gift" of medicines, including streptomycin, penicillin and vitamins.[27] In fact, so strong an effect had the President's offer on the population, that not only was the Albanian progaganda machine obliged to continue, even until July, to denounce his "diabolic aims"[28] but a "socialist emulation" among Moscow's satellites in sending "gifts" to this "advance post" of the Communist world was set in motion. The Chinese People's Republic sent a "gift" including 20,000 tons of wheat, 2,000 tons of rice, 2,000 tons of sugar, 100,000 meters of silk fabrics and 200 tons of hemp rope.[29]

Out of Isolation

STUDENTS of East European affairs have noticed that, in spite of his apparent eagerness to imitate his masters in the Kremlin, Hoxha has dealt with certain aspects of the "new course" in a rather curious manner. He was, for instance, slow in applying the principle of "collective leadership" and

[21] Two decrees were issued on October 13. One provided for immediate distribution of bonuses already earned by peasants for prompt fulfillment of obligations to the state. The other made it easier for peasants to obtain forest supplies. A decree of October 29 was aimed specifically at improving conditions in the Zadrime area, where the predominantly Catholic peasantry was outspokenly anti-Communist.

[22] *La République Populaire d' Albanie*, No. 854, p. 5.

[23] Editorial in *Bashkimi*, April 15, 1955.

[24] *Zeri i Popullit*, September 10, 1955.

[25] *Ibid.*, March 29, 1955.

[26] Albanian Telegraphic Agency Report, March 6, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as ATA).

[27] *Ibid.*, March 3, 1955.

[28] Radio Tirana, July 11, 1955.

[29] ATA, March 30, 1955.

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relinquished with obvious reluctance some of the multiple functions he had accumulated. Thus, he was the last of the satellite leaders to apply the principle of separation between party and government leadership. It was only on July 20, 1954 that he resigned the premiership to Mehmet Shehu, retaining for himself the sole position of First Secretary of the party. In the matter of amnesties, which are currently in vogue behind the Iron Curtain, he was not very generous; reportedly less than a thousand people have been released from prisons. Finally, the permanent purge under which Albania has lived since Hoxha's assumption of power seems to continue. A campaign against bourgeois nationalism and other "deviations" is only part of the picture. On June 24, 1955, Tuk Jakova and Bedri Spahiu, two of Hoxha's earliest companions, and the last two survivors of the 1941 Central Committee, were eliminated from the government; the latter was dismissed from his post as Chairman of the Albanian-Soviet Friendship Society and expelled from its General Council at the demand of Deputy Premier Manush Myftiu, to be replaced by Vice-Premier Hysni Kapo on August 15, 1955. Hoxha is the only member of the 1941 Central Committee in public life today. All the rest are known either to be dead or to have disappeared.

The Soviet Union has recently decided to bring Albania more closely in line with the new Communist peace offensive. Soviet officials accordingly have tried to end Albania's feeling of isolation from the East. The two-months' visit of a part of the Soviet navy led by the Chief Commander of the Black Sea War Fleet (May 1, 1954); the space devoted by the Soviet and satellite press to the tenth anniversary of the Communist assumption of power in Albania;[30] the presence of a special Soviet delegation led by Tarassov, Vice-Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the Albanian People's Assembly's session on March 31, 1955, are all evidence of this policy. The culmination of the new phase in Soviet-Albanian relations came with Albania's accession to the Warsaw Treaty in May 1955. A ". . . great political victory for the Albanian people. . . . From now on the enemies of our country will have to talk differently to us and will have to show more respect for the power and vitality of our people's regime," boasted Premier Shehu on his return to Tirana.[31] All talk of "the isolation of Albania" is ended, exulted *Zeri i Popullit*. "The Albanian people, guided by the party's Central Committee headed by Enver Hoxha, will show by their acts that they deserve the friendship of the brotherly nations and the place they hold in the great camp of peace and socialism," added the paper.[32] "The Warsaw Treaty has made our People's Republic inviolable by our enemies," declared Shehu on July 1, 1955.

Nevertheless, this belated and so passionately desired guarantee of Soviet and satellite support did not help the Albanian Communist leaders to rid themselves completely of their "isolation" complex. Nor has it, in spite of the improved international atmosphere and the resumption of normal relations with Yugoslavia, prevented them from brandishing the "imperialist encirclement" bogey. In a speech made at the Democratic Front Congress on June 27, 1955, Hoxha, for instance, was still asking for "further strengthening [of] the hatred of . . . Anglo-US imperialism." And the Albanian press, in a series of articles against "bourgeois nationalism" and the "strengthening of party unity" repeatedly stressed that "Albania is encircled by capitalist countries." *Ruga e Partis*, the periodical journal of the party's Central Committee, explained that "this encirclement maintains and revives these [anti-Marxist opportunist and reactionary] views and fully supports them and their proponents." Furthermore, "capitalist encirclement . . . also encourages efforts to infiltrate the party ranks with [capitalist-minded] people for the purpose of destroying it from within."[33] The ghosts of Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and other "anti-party elements" who had been eliminated were resuscitated for the occasion. The party was warned "against any kind of liberalism or opportunism in its ranks and against bourgeois nationalism,"[34] and party members were told to "spare no efforts until hostile and anti-party elements had been completely eradicated from their ranks."[35] From these articles one learns that "in Albania the class struggle was becoming more intensive" and that "imperialism was trying to unleash a new war;" it is hard to escape the impression that the wind of Stalinism is still blowing in Albania.

[30] The November 28, 1954, issue of the Soviet weekly *Ogonyok* (Flame) devoted a large section to commemorating Albania's independence.

[31] ATA (in French), May 28, 1955.

[32] May 24, 1955.

[33] *Ruga e Partis*, quoted in *Borba* (Belgrade), October 16, 1955.

[34] *Zeri i Popullit*, July 21, 1955.

[35] *Ibid.*, July 17, 1955.

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The "Popular Front" Tactic in 1905

Leopold H. Haimson: *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism*, Harvard University Press, 1955, 246 pp.

Donald W. Treadgold: *Lenin and His Rivals: The Struggle for Russia's Future, 1898–1906*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1955, 291 pp.

Reviewed by Ronald Thompson

PROFESSORS of history sometimes like to put a new class of students in a proper frame of mind by recalling the old adage that "those who do not study history are doomed to repeat it." Among the stern lessons of the recent past which seemingly must be learned over and over again is the very fundamental one that cooperation with a Communist Party is in the long run impossible. United fronts, popular fronts, and national fronts have so often been attempted with the Communists, to the later dismay of their other participants, that a serious study of history's first recorded example of the popular front tactic is long overdue.

Such a study, based on extensive use of the polemical sources for the period, is now available in the two separate but complementary books herewith reviewed. Haimson's volume logically comes first, since it deals only with the preparatory period, 1883–1904, and is limited to the Russian Social Democratic Party and its Bolshevik and Menshevik wings. Treadgold's volume develops the story further by concentrating on the period of the 1905 revolution itself and by including the Kadet (or liberal) Party and the Socialist Revolutionary (or populist) Party along with the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Both books succeed admirably in delineating the various types of oppositional and revolutionary movements characteristic of a country just beginning to emerge into full political life; and in their pages the principal opposition leaders live again: Lenin among the Bolsheviks, Plekhanov and Martov among the Mensheviks, Miliukov and Maklakov among the Kadets, and Chernov among the SR's (Socialist Revolutionaries).

A striking feature of the situation in Russia fifty years ago—though it has its parallels in other parts of the world today—was the way the liberals and moderate radicals contributed to their own discomfiture at the hands of Lenin's Bolsheviks. Russia was a land in which an old élite—the autocracy—confronted a new élite in the collective person of the intelligentsia and its four oppositional parties as indicated above. This intelligentsia and these parties, though they justified their every action in the name of the "people" (the peasants and the semi-peasant proletarians), were in their actual mode of living far removed from the peasant and proletarian masses. They were a Westernized intelligentsia with a strong addiction not only to rigidly doctrinaire patterns of thought in general but above all and specifically to the Marxist pattern of thought.

The Marxist pattern of thought meant more than a general predilection toward socialist solutions; it meant a whole *Weltanschauung* in which Russia was seen as confronting a two-phase revolution—a first or "bourgeois-democratic" phase and a second or "proletarian-socialist" phase. Some (the Kadets) would not regard the second phase of the revolution as either desirable or necessary, and others (the SR's) would define the two phases in different terms, but by and large it was this commonly accepted theoretical framework which enabled liberals and radicals to come together and agree that at any rate they could cooperate in bringing about the first phase. Out of this modicum of seeming agreement came the elements of what Treadgold calls the "popular front" of 1905. Always implicit rather than explicit, never uniting all four parties in any systematic or particularly cordial fashion, by none regarded as anything more than an *ad hoc* arrangement for the immediate struggle against the Tsar, this embryonic popular front was nontheless taken seriously in some quarters and was by many individuals given impromptu support in high hopes and good faith.

The germs of both the popular front idea and its eventual disruption may be discovered in Haimson's account of the early controversies between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. He relates the Marxist, and above all Menshevik, concept of a two-phase revolution to the traditional reliance of the Russian intelligentsia upon the "spontaneous" mass action of the Russian people. Since the two-phase revolution was taken to be an essential part of the very structure of historical reality, the Mensheviks naturally assumed that the

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spontaneous action of the masses would conform to the general two-phase pattern.

But against this view there was, even before the development of Marxism itself, a conflicting tradition among the more headstrong intelligentsia that history was made not by the reflex action of the spontaneous masses but by the heroic will of a conscious élite. In this view, revolutions did not just happen; they had to be instigated by specially chosen individuals who were conscious of history's true purposes.

"Consciousness" was thus set over "spontaneity" in a rival theory of development which in Marxist, and specifically Bolshevik, terms came to mean not peacefully waiting one's turn until the second or socialist phase of the revolution should in its own good time materialize, but rather striking single-mindedly for the second phase of the revolution even while going through the motions of participating in the first phase. Plekhanov and Martov could, with clear conscience, join the Kadet liberals in a working alliance for immediate aims since for the first phase of the revolution Menshevik and Kadet aims were almost identical. But for Lenin, for whom it would become as important to gain the advantage over the liberals in the first phase of the revolution as it was to defeat the Tsarist regime itself, an alliance of the popular front variety could only be a cloak to hide a deeper purpose.

The Kadet liberals for their part were in a particularly awkward position with respect to the popular front. Properly speaking, as Treadgold points out, the Kadets stood somewhere between the other three parties (all of which were radical) on the one hand, and the autocratic government of Tsar Nicholas II on the other. Inside the Kadet Party itself there were both a right wing under Maklakov which sought an understanding with the Tsar, and a left wing under Miliukov which sought rapprochement with the radicals. When, on the eve of 1905, the right wing had several times been rebuffed by the myopically-minded Nicholas II, the liberal movement as a whole swung to the side of Miliukov, who thereupon inaugurated a popular front policy for his party.

This policy reduced the maneuverability of the Kadet Party to a minimum since, with respect to the Tsar, it now took the essentially revolutionary stand of rejecting any thought of agreement with the autocracy, short of the latter's complete surrender; and with respect to the radical parties, it embarked upon that most absurd of liberal policies which proclaims there are "No enemies on the left" or "The left can do no wrong." Confidently awaiting the promised convening of a new Duma in order to lead the radical parties in a constitutional offensive against the autocracy, Miliukov in 1905 apparently did not realize the predicament he was in. For by firmly closing the door on his right while leaving the one on his left permanently ajar, he made himself the prisoner of the left, and especially of those forces on the left which might desire to do him harm.

If the Kadets represented the extension of the popular front forces in the direction of the autocracy, the SR's represented their extension in the direction of that other great fact of Russian life—the peasantry. Not that the SR's themselves were peasants—like the other opposition parties, they were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the intelligentsia. Nor did their land program reflect peasant wishes. The peasants, as everyone knew, were for the transfer of all land to themselves; but while every one of the intelligentsia parties was prepared to confiscate non-peasant land, none advocated giving it to the peasants to work individually. The SR program went so far in its doctrinaire collectivism as to call for abolition of even the existing private peasant allotments, to the great chagrin of the genuine peasant delegates in the First Duma. Chernov, the spokesman for the SR's, in his eagerness to see the peasant as a sort of village socialist, even denied Social Democratic contentions as to the "bourgeois" character of the first phase of the revolution altogether.

As a result, Plekhanov and other Mensheviks tended to look askance at the SR's as doctrinally unsound. Even Lenin scoffed at their theories, though he was pleased to find someone else agreeing, for whatever reason, with his own anti-bourgeois, anti-liberal orientation. The SR flair for militancy and intransigence was in general a source of pleasure to Lenin as well as of anguish to Miliukov, since it led the SR's to boycott the Duma, thus depriving the Kadets of their mass support.

The Mensheviks' doctrinaire passivity, the Kadets' self-imposed limitations on their own maneuverability and the SR's disorganized confusion all serve to emphasize the greater ruthlessness and flexibility of the Bolsheviks within the popular front group. Lenin accepted the two-phase revolution and other aspects of Marxist theory *in name*, but in practice he gave that theory an entirely different content. With his view that revolutions have to be *made* and that victory belongs to him who seizes it, Lenin was led to the conclusion that a good Marxist party must be not simply the heir of capitalism but the murderer thereof as well. Where the Mensheviks maintained that the bourgeois world must wreck itself, the Bolsheviks were determined to sit in the driver's

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seat and engineer the crash. And because he was bent on destroying the bourgeoisie, Lenin was also bent on destroying the liberals or Kadets, who to his way of thinking "objectively" represented the bourgeoisie. The first phase of the revolution, thought Lenin, would still have to be described as "bourgeois" since otherwise it would scare off all support, but bourgeois liberals must under no circumstances be permitted to reap the fruits of victory themselves.

Lenin specifically repudiated the idea of equal alliances between political parties when he wrote of such arrangements in 1898:

In my opinion the term "utilization" is a more precise and suitable word than the phrase "support and alliance"; the latter points to an equality with these allies, when . . . they must go to the rear even if they gnash their teeth.

Lenin needed "allies"—or, as he would have it, objects of utilization—no less than Martov and Plekhanov. Only, where the Mensheviks chose the liberals as allies and treated them almost as superiors, the Bolsheviks chose the peasants and regarded them as inferiors. The peasants, in Plekhanov's view, made unsatisfactory allies as compared with the bourgeoisie, because the peasants were out of step with History while the bourgeoisie were History's preordained next favorites. But in Lenin's view the peasants made ideal allies, since, being politically backward and incapable of leadership, they could not challenge the hegemony of Lenin's own party. Hence Lenin's proposed union with the peasants was to take the form not of an alliance with Chernov's SR's but of a *smychka* or "united front from below" in which Lenin's side would supply the generals and the "non-party" peasant masses would furnish the common soldiers. Such peasant help, thought Lenin, would enable the workers' movement to crush both Tsarism and the liberal bourgeoisie in the first phase of the revolution, while peasant resistance would be unable to prevent the movement from subsequently pushing on to the second phase.

The ultimate alternatives, as Lenin saw them in 1905, were either his own proposal of a "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" or Maklakov's proposal of a coalition between the autocracy and liberalism. Success for one or the other alternative would depend on whether the course of events was peaceful (via trade unions, legal activities, and bourgeois forms) or violent (via armed insurrection, a revolutionary army, and a revolutionary government). The Marxists themselves could to a considerable extent influence the outcome by pursuing one or the other of their two tactics—the Menshevik tactic of peacefully following the liberal bourgeoisie or the Bolshevik tactic of militantly leading the petty bourgeoisie or peasants. If Social Democrats emphasized legal activity, the workers' party would play second fiddle, and the liberals would triumph; if they emphasized illegal activity, the workers' party would take the lead and would mobilize the peasants. Peaceful methods meant success for autocracy and liberalism; violent methods meant victory for the revolutionary democratic dictatorship. Concessions by the Tsar to the liberals would be positively harmful in diverting the people to peaceful bourgeois reforms and away from the revolutionary conquest of power. The real issue was power, not reforms of any kind this side of victory. And power meant power for the workers, *i.e.*, for the Social Democrats, *i.e.*, for Lenin himself.

Lenin did not succeed in seizing power for himself in 1905, but he did prevent Miliukov from coming to power in a peaceful revolution. Lenin's policy of violence (abetted in part by Chernov) ruled out Miliukov's policy of peaceful change (abetted as prospective heir by Martov). Lenin and Chernov ostensibly stood for the same immediate goals, represented by the first phase of the revolution (as did Miliukov and Martov), but their method of armed uprising was actually designed to *prevent* the liberals from carrying that phase to completion. Hence the original doctrine of two successive stages of the revolution had in practice given way to two simultaneous and competing revolutions—Miliukov's and Lenin's. The "popular front" of the opposition parties in 1905 had been torn apart not by the "betrayals" of the liberals, as Lenin alleged, but by the sabotage of the Bolsheviks.

The fault of the Kadets was that they took the popular front idea too seriously and bound themselves over to its power by their dual policies of "no enemies on the left" and "no compromise with the right". It was a fault that should strike a responsive chord since it was history's first encounter with Communist tactics in a popular front situation. The uniqueness of Miliukov's case was that he really had to learn the hard way, having no previous evidence to go by. But the really strange part of the story begins in 1917; since then the same experience has been repeated over and over again, for all the world as if there were no such thing as an accumulation of wisdom. It seems true, as the history teachers said, that "Those who do not study history are doomed to repeat it."

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Economic Dilemma of a Soviet Satellite

Thad Paul Alton:
Polish Postwar Economy,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1955, 330 pp.

Reviewed by Alfred Zauberman

ALL students of Communist economics will welcome Thad Paul Alton's new study of the Polish economy as a scholarly work of great merit. Working with materials made scarce by Communist censorship, Mr. Alton has nevertheless convincingly and, it seems to this reviewer, very accurately described the economic system which Poland's new Communist leaders have foisted upon the country. The author's observations bear witness not only to his technical skill as an economist but to his political acumen as well, for he has considered how economic institutions impinge upon human beings. His story of the process by which Polish social and economic patterns were forced into a shape resembling the Soviet model is, therefore, of general interest.

Mr. Alton's inquiry is focused on developments immediately after World War II, but he also takes into account economic changes through 1953 and economic plans through 1955, the end of the First Six-Year Plan. His analysis of the situation prevailing in Poland immediately after the war and during the first few years of Communist control is particularly interesting; for he presents the early economic successes of the Polish Communists (measured in gross figures) as stemming from objective factors rather than from the inherent applicability of Communist economic doctrine and practice.

In the first place, by 1937 the Polish government had begun a program of partial economic planning entailing "a wide array of government controls and direct participation in production and distribution . . . seeking to establish economic unity, provide for national defense, and ensure fuller employment . . ." Centralized economic planning, then, was no novelty to the Polish people. Of great significance also was the fact that the Communists attempted at first to balance the private and cooperative sectors of the economy with the state sector. It is fascinating to be reminded by Mr. Alton that only ten years ago Eugeniusz Szyr, now Chairman of the State Commission of Economic Planning, asserted that the new Polish economic system would be "a synthesis of the pattern of planned economy in the Soviet Union and the positive aspects of the economy of the Western democracies." And about the same time the noted Polish economist Oskar Lange insisted that the Polish economic structure must prevent the state bureaucracy as well as the capitalists and the landed gentry from getting complete control of economic power. So successfully was this balance kept that an analyst of the early Polish economic programs has described them as "a curious mixture of Marx and Keynes." [1]

Of even greater significance in the early successes of the Polish postwar economy, however, were ". . . the added industrial capacity afforded by the territories acquired from Germany, . . . the high efficiency of capital investment in increasing production during the period of reconstruction, . . . the rapid expansion of urban employment made possible by the reserves of unemployed labor . . ." [2] It is certain, moreover, that the pace of Polish recovery was immeasurably speeded by the tremendous amount of aid poured into Poland by the UNRRA program—almost half a billion dollars between 1945 and 1947. The food, clothing, medical and sanitation supplies provided by UNRRA were crucial in restoring a war-weary people to productive efforts. The Polish government sold these supplies to its citizens, thus significantly draining their purchasing power, curbing immediate consumer demands, and enabling Polish planners to give priority to retooling the indsutrial plant and stimulating agricultural production. Indeed, even in these sectors direct UNRRA aid was significant, totaling $171,035,000 between 1945 and 1947.

Although the partial freedom allowed individual initiative played a tremendous role in the successes enjoyed by the Polish economy after the war, the imperative demands of alliance with the Soviet Union soon made this period a wistful memory. In Chapter IV, "The Extension of State Control," Mr. Alton

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[1] Seymour E. Harris, *Economic Planning*, London, 1949, p. 433.

[2] In discussing the territories acquired from Germany, the author points out that according to the 1938 level of industrial production, these areas had attained an output two-thirds as large as in all prewar Poland. (p. 25.)

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renders an excellent account of the retreat from the economic philosophy of the early days, of the manner in which the Keynesian aspects were removed from the "curious mixture" and the Soviet system of planning forced upon Polish economists. Beginning in 1948, Polish planning proceeded more and more by reference to current Soviet practice. In 1949 the Central Board of Planning was replaced by the State Commission of Economic Planning, which is the Polish equivalent of *Gosplan* in more than name only. Shortly thereafter, both the government and the economic administration in Poland were reorganized to correspond more closely to the Soviet model.[3] With the Six-Year Plan, which began in 1950, Poland was thrust onto the path of "economic heroism." Forced industrialization was the order of the day. The means by which the change in system was accomplished were similar to those by which, in an earlier period, the Bukharinist supporters of a slower pace of industrialization were purged in the Soviet Union. In Poland, too, the process took its human toll. Opponents of the program were purged, removed from their positions, and their criticism silenced.

MR. Alton's discussion of the manner in which Communist statistics distort the facts indicates the need for Western economists to continue research until the true situation is revealed. The precise effect of the "upward bias" built into the index of gross industrial output must be determined. For example, according to official Polish statistics gross industrial output was 181 percent higher in 1955 than in 1949. This figure loses significance, however, when one considers that no key industry whose performance is measurable in physical terms, such as tons, fulfilled its Six-Year Plan target. Since the industries in this category include the coal, oil, electric power, iron and steel, ferrous and non-ferrous ores, cement, fertilizer, tractor and farm equipment industries, as well as, of course, the consumer goods sector, one inevitably wonders precisely how the official gross output index was obtained and what it would have been if computed by Western methods.

Mr. Alton correctly predicted that fulfillment of the Six-Year Plan for agricultural production would fall substantially below its goals. The regime failed to provide sufficient incentives for the peasants, and its emphasis on forced industrialization deprived the agricultural sector of labor-saving capital goods.[4] While the yields of the main grain crops were slightly higher in 1955 than in 1950—setting a new record for postwar Poland—it must be remembered that 1955 was a record-breaking year almost everywhere in Europe and is not representative. By and large, Polish performance in the agricultural sector has been a dramatic failure. The overall agricultural target was fulfilled only about 40 percent; yields in bread grain crops failed to keep pace with growth of population.

Developments have also borne out Mr. Alton's forecast that the Six-Year Plan goal for the national income would be considerably underfulfilled. The author is likewise correct in noting that the disappointingly slow growth in national income has added to the country's investment burden; in fact, in the light of recent revelations, that burden is heavier than the author himself judged. He wrote:

. . . the share of national income allocated under the Six-Year Plan to total investment, including increments to fixed capital, working capital and various reserves and stockpiles, was expected to increase from about 22 percent in 1949 to 28 percent in 1955. In the performance of the plan, however, the actual allocation to investment was raised to about 27 percent of the national income in 1950, and 28 percent in 1951 and then it declined to 25 percent by 1953.[5]

We know now that these calculations were all made in terms of *current* prices; and, because in a Soviet-type economy consumer goods bear a very heavy tax load in comparison with investment goods, such calculations must be distorted. Indeed, Polish authorities have recently admitted that from 1952 on the share of capital accumulation in the national income has been falling if calculated in *current* prices, but that the share of capital accumulation has been rising in terms of *fixed* prices (*i.e.*, prewar prices), *as was envisaged by the Six-Year Plan.*[6] Thus, official statistics calculated in terms of current prices, have been presented in such a way as to overestimate the share of consumption in the national economy. Communist statistics, when they are not blatantly mendacious, can mislead by obscuring the conceptual context.

MR. Alton has broached several aspects of the impact of the new system on living standards, "real" wages and "real" peasant incomes. He is on the whole right in saying that the inflation prevalent in Poland reflects faulty financial planning. Yet it is conceivable that the reverse is at least partially

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 294.

[4] An incidental result of this system of priorities is that so few workers have been released from rural to urban areas that from 1954 on there has been a relatively serious labor shortage in industrial enterprises.

[5] *Polish Postwar Economy*, p. 141.

[6] Kazimierz Laski, "Stosunek miedzy akumulacja a spozyciem . . ." (Relationship between capital accumulation and consumption) *Ekonomista*, No. 4, 1955, p. 68.

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true. Under the Communist system of forced industrialization consumer consumption is considered a production cost and is therefore kept as low as possible. In a deliberate attempt to extract productive effort at a lower "real" cost, extra purchasing power is often injected into the system without increasing the flow of consumer goods. Inflation is thus just one of the many ways of enforcing the "abstinence from consumption" that Mr. Alton so ably discusses.

The practices of the Communist planners have resulted in imbalances which have created a number of bottlenecks in the economy. Although some of these can be ascribed to the fact that "higher stage" industries sometimes outpace their supplies of fuel and raw materials, the critical situation has been caused mainly by the imbalance between the production of capital goods and consumer goods, especially when the low level of agricultural production is kept in mind. It is probably accurate to estimate that, when allowance is made for the cost of maintaining the armed forces and the swollen government and party administrative, consumption must have fallen by 1953 to a point well below 50 percent of the national income. So serious was the situation then that Polish planners were forced to reallocate their resources. Nevertheless, a return to the pre-1953 order of priorities, if not to the pre-1953 breakneck tempos, has been announced for the period beginning in January 1956. Thus again, the history of postwar Poland makes abundantly clear that human considerations do not trouble Communist planners, that immediate human wants are sacrificed to future statistical goals.

Is the "Thaw" Spreading?

In the last months of 1955, the world was treated to some strange rumblings from the literary "fronts" in the East European "people's democracies." On August 21 the Warsaw weekly *Nowa Kultura* published "A Poem for Adults," by the once intransigently Marxist, yet highly talented poet, Adam Ważyk. Ważyk's lines combined despair with an unprecedented note of defiance—despair over the drab uniformity of life in a Communist state and defiance of the sterile formulae of "socialist realism" imposed upon writers and artists. At first the poem passed almost unnoticed. But two months later, after other Polish writers had evidenced similar disillusionment, the Communist Party struck back. According to reports received in the West, the editor of *Nowa Kultura*, Pawel Hoffman, was dismissed from his post; and Ważyk, though still reported at liberty, has published nothing since.

The events in Poland have had their sequel in other satellites. In November the Central Committee of the Hungarian CP found it necessary to pass a resolution condemning a group of Communist writers as "rightist opportunists" and "standard-bearers of counterrevolution who, through organized action, attacked the party and state organs." V. Chervenkov, leader of the Bulgarian CP, soon followed suit, charging numerous Bulgarian authors with giving vent to bourgeois, rightist and otherwise unsavory views. And there is evidence, though details are still lacking, that in Czechoslovakia, too, the party is reacting harshly to a spate of anti-Communist sentiments voiced by writers and poets.

There is little doubt that the writers' "rebellion" is indicative, at least to some extent, of the psychological conflicts besetting artists whose initial loyalty to Marxism-Leninism has been completely shaken by the realities of the Communist system. How have the regimes responded to it? Will they succeed in striking a balance between Stalinist rigidity, which leads to stagnation, on the one hand, and liberalism, which engenders "rightist deviationism," on the other? And what about the writers themselves? Are they attempting to solve their creative problems within the confines of ideological conformity, or do they wish to do away with dogma altogether?

These are some of the problems which will be probed in the next issue of *Problems of Communism*. Czeslaw Milosz, famous Polish poet and novelist, the eminent Hungarian writer Ferenc Kormendi, and Dr. Stefan Marinoff, Bulgarian journalist and political analyst, will discuss literary developments in their respective countries. Their articles will shed light on the fascinating question of how far the "thaw," originated in Moscow, has and may be expected to spread.

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Recent Studies of Communist Affairs

GERMANY

Sowjetrecht und Klassenbildung (Soviet Law and the Formation of Classes), by Reinhart Maurach, in *Ost-Europa*, Stuttgart, December 1955.

Any sound analysis of Soviet law must operate on two levels: the theoretical and the practical. The author of the present article has taken account of this dual need and, as a result, has come up with a brief but useful capsule study of Soviet legal philosophy.

The classical Marxist conception regarded law as part of the so-called "superstructure," *i.e.*, as one of the non-material (social, political, cultural, *etc.*) institutions of society, which merely reflect the material (economic) basis of organization. In other words, law was an instrument of the dominant class, set up to protect its own material interests in the struggle with the oppressed classes. Stalin added an important modification to this doctrine, asserting that under certain conditions (namely those in the USSR), the superstructure can influence and change the essential nature of the material base. This revision, as Mr. Maurach points out, clearly strengthened the theoretical foundations of law within the Soviet state by assigning new, dynamic qualities to it.

According to Soviet doctrine there are no ruling and subject classes in the USSR, but only harmoniously cooperating groups of workers, peasants and intelligentsia within the all-encompassing working class. In fact, however, the ruling intelligentsia, whose interests are intimately bound up with the continuance of the Soviet Communist regime, has asserted and continues to assert its demands for great protection of its privileged material and social status. This trend is reflected in the evolution of Soviet law. While conceding nothing in the non-material, political sphere, the state has made a number of significant concessions to the security and property-minded managerial class, particularly since the end of World War II.

A few examples suffice to illustrate the author's point: (1) Personal private property is more strictly protected than in many capitalist countries; since 1947, common larceny is punishable by five years' imprisonment. (2) Real property such as houses may now be held in perpetuity, according to a law of 1948; previously such property reverted to the state after a tenure of no more than 50–65 years. (3) Inheritance rights for family members, totally abolished in 1918, were fully restored in 1945, together with regulations tightening the legal bonds and obligations of the family unit.

Thus the spirit of Soviet law has come to reflect the ossified conservatism of Soviet society. What was once an instrument for change in the hands of a revolutionary movement has become the coveted shield for a relatively narrow privileged class.

INDIA

Nationalism and Communism in Asia, by Shao Chuan Leng, in *United Asia*, Bombay, Vol. VII, No. 4.

A decisive struggle is taking place today on the Asian continent between two powerful ideologies—nationalism and communism. But while these doctrines are ultimately irreconcilable—one leading potentially to freedom and independence and the other to tyranny and domination by Moscow or Peiping—they have many surface similarities. The danger of communism lies precisely in this seeming affinity, and in the possibility that pseudo-nationalist communism may appear to offer quicker and easier answers to the problems and aspirations of the Asian peoples than genuine nationalism.

In support of his thesis the author outlines three principal characteristics of Asian nationalism: (1) xenophobia and anti-imperialism; (2) revival of national culture and traditions; (3) socio-economic reform. Lenin's important theses on the national and colonial question, presented to the Third Communist International in 1920, had the appearance of compatibility with these goals and have been quoted *ad infinitum* by the Communists in their bid for support among the Asian peoples.

Mao's victory on the mainland of China, proclaimed as a victory over imperialism, has greatly strengthened communism's pose as the champion of nationalistic causes. While both Moscow and Peiping exercise control over the various Communist parties in Asia, the author believes Chinese influence has been growing in relation to that of the USSR.

Tactics for achieving power in Asia have varied from country to country, ranging from open aggression in Korea and armed rebellion in Indochina, Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines, to "united front" and "peaceful revolution" slogans in Indonesia, Japan and lately India. Perhaps the most effective appeal put forward is the promise of "shortcut" and "easy" solutions to Asia's economic and social problems. Yet the author shows that wherever genuine nationalism has espoused the cause of progress, communism has had little success. In the Philippines and the Andhra province of India, for example, progressive nationalist leaders took the helm, and the Communists were overwhelmingly defeated. On the other hand, in two Asian countries where communism did triumph—Indochina and China—the success of the movement was a direct consequence of weakness in the indigenous nationalist leaderships and of powerful military assistance from abroad.

The armor of communism is by no means impregnable, argues the author. Its chief weakness is the obvious subservience of local party organizations to foreign powers, which is fundamentally incompatible with the basic premise of nationalism. The answer

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to the false promises of communism is *enlightened* Asian nationalism. Where it rules, communism cannot survive. L. L.

THE UNITED STATES

The Wavering "Line" of Indian Communism, by Morton Schwartz, in *Political Science Quarterly*, New York, LXX, No. 4 (December 1955).

The continual dilemma of the Communist Party of India (CPI), as its domestic policies are forced to wag along behind the shifting needs of Soviet foreign policy, are admirably summarized in this article. Mr. Schwartz states:

In its effort to build strength, with the hope of eventually winning India over to the Communist bloc, the Communist Party of India (CPI) has employed three basic strategies: cooperation with the Indian government, attempt at revolutionary seizure of power, and united front with other leftist parties *vis-à-vis* the Congress Party.

In early 1947 the CPI supported Nehru's new government because the Soviet Union's policy at that time was one of cooperation with the democracies; but when Andrei Zhdanov's speech at the founding conference of the Cominform in September 1947 indicated the Soviet desire for more militant tactics, the CPI reacted immediately. Ranadive replaced Joshi as Secretary General of the CPI and a series of Communist-led strikes, riots and disorders rocked India.

In 1949 Ranadive criticized the CPI leaders in Andhra for slavishly following Mao Tse-tung's precepts of basing the party on the peasantry, and the wrath of the Cominform was brought down on Ranadive. *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* berated the CPI in these words:

The path taken by the Chinese people . . . is the path that must be taken by the people of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy.

Obviously the CP of the Soviet Union concurred, and the CPI took the hint. In July 1950 Ranadive was replaced by Rao, leader of the Andhra group.

The CPI now (1950) "adopted the tactic of a 'united anti-imperialist front,' an adaptation of the Chinese Communist concept of the 'block of four classes.'" Accordingly, alliances were sought with bourgeois parties, even though reliance on armed revolt was not completely discontinued until after the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. In October 1951 Ajoy Ghosh was elected General Secretary of the CPI, and a united front policy was adopted. The CPI ran candidates in the elections held later that year and in early 1952. Today, as an accepted temporary tactic of Communist parties, "the CPI continues to employ the parliamentary system adroitly in its search for further areas of vulnerability."

Mr. Schwartz feels, however, that the present CPI attitude is no major reversal, but merely one of calculated watchful waiting. Indeed, early in 1951, shortly before the CPI inaugurated their policy of parliamentary opposition, a commission of Indian Communists returned from Moscow with a new directive stating that the main objectives of the CPI

. . . cannot be realized by a peaceful parliamentary way. These objectives can only be realized through a revolution, through the overthrow of the present Indian state and its replacement by a people's democratic state. . . .

Mr. Schwartz concludes that revolution remains the ultimate extension of any success the CPI may achieve through their tactic of parliamentary opposition. When the Soviet Union deems it useful, the CPI will resort to armed rebellion.

Report on the "International Congress for the Philosophy of Science" in Zurich, Switzerland, August 23–28, 1954, by Max Reiser, in *Philosophy of Science*, Baltimore, Maryland, Vol. 22, No. 4 (October 1955).

While the lack of free play of ideas in the Soviet Union is a recognized fact, Western observers have equally recognized the high level of technical accomplishment among Soviet scientific specialists. Thus, the appalling barrenness of Soviet speculative thought revealed at the August 1954 International Congress for the Philosophy of Science came as somewhat of a surprise even to the most sophisticated and well-informed of the Western philosophers present. In a report on the Congress, Dr. Max Reiser offers an extremely critical evaluation of the contribution of the Soviet scholars present.

The "keen interest" and "tense curiosity" with which the Western delegates to the Congress awaited the arrival of the Soviet philosophers did not survive the reading of the first Soviet paper. This is how Dr. Reiser reports it:

The leading paper . . . ["The Science of Society and of Social Life," delivered by P. N. Fedosseev, Director of the Philosophy Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences] was in fact a heterogeneous mixture of arguments about the aims and achievements of Soviet social policies and of their expected benefits for the future of mankind . . . Feodosseev [*sic*] expounded at the same time the epistemological theory . . . that all those teachings rejected by him could not but be true since they were all contrary to human progress and happiness and because, as he pointed out, it was proved time and again by history that evil theories detri mental to humanity were false and had to be false.

Fedosseev then recommended that the dissemination of "untrue" theories be prevented, a bald-faced espousal of thought control which was greeted by the assembled scholars "with great astonishment." It was obvious, writes Dr. Reiser, that the Soviet philosophers considered their Western colleagues "as presumptive carriers of . . . nefarious political creeds or convictions."

The second major speech (ten were read in the Congress' discussion sections), by the Soviet scholar B. M. Kedrov, dealt with the classification of sciences, and it also illustrated the distance between Soviet and Western thinking. Kedrov advanced a principle of classification originated by Friedrich Engels and

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praised his principle as an improvement on Auguste Comte's. "Such a paper," writes Dr. Reiser, "might have interested somebody perhaps 70 years ago. . . . The audience listened baffled and speechless . . ."

As the Congress progressed, the gap between the Soviet philosophers and those from the West became increasingly apparent. The Soviet delegates hardly participated in the discussions following the other papers. They sat "tight and tense on their benches," writes Dr. Reiser; "one had the clear impression that they felt themselves as a beleaguered group in a besieged fortress . . ." The best he can say about the Soviet philosophers' contribution is that its low level proved embarrassing to the other delegates.

R. B.

Will They Be Rehabilitated?

At the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the old Stalinist historian A. M. Pankratova, editor of the journal *Voprosi Istorii* (Problems of History), strongly criticized the entire trend of Stalinist historiography (which she so eminently represented for over two decades), for its "arbitrary handling of facts," for "embellishing historical events," for "fostering a personality cult" and, last but not least, for "poorly reflecting . . . the activities of the Old Bolsheviks, the collaborators of Lenin." "Poorly reflecting" is a magnificent understatement, for during the Great Purge (1935–39) virtually the entire Bolshevik "old guard"—the men who made the revolution and headed the Soviet state in its first decade—was destroyed. Some were shot, some disappeared, and some committed suicide.

Perhaps the first step toward the rehabilitation of some of Stalin's victims (and there were thousands) has already been taken (see "Iconoclasm in Moscow," p. 2). Even if that were true, however, a staggering task still faces Soviet historians. We offer below a list of some of the leading Bolshevik figures whose lives were destroyed and whose reputations were defamed by the Stalinist dictatorship. The list is far from complete: it does not include the thousands of Soviet diplomats, foreign Communist leaders, government and party functionaries, military leaders, writers, scientists, scholars (among them a good number of historians . . .) and other prominent figures who vanished as "enemies of the people." Will they be rehabilitated?

Leon Trotsky—organizer of the Bolshevik Revolution, first Foreign Commissar and Commissar of War. Assassinated in Mexico in 1940.

Grigori Zinoviev—member of the party from 1901; after October Revolution, Chairman, Petrograd Soviet; chairman of the Comintern, 1919–26. Shot in 1936.

Leon Kamenev—member of the party from 1901; editor of *Pravda*, 1914; Lenin's deputy as Chairman of the Politburo after the October Revolution; Chairman, Moscow Soviet, 1918–26; Ambassador to Italy, 1927. Shot in 1936.

Sergei Mrachkovsky—member of the party from 1905; organizer of Bolshevik insurrection in the Urals, 1917; military hero during Civil War (1918–19). Shot in 1936.

Ivan Smirnov—party member from 1898; several times imprisoned by Tsarist police; Chairman of Communications, 1923–27. Shot in 1936.

Vagarshak Ter-Vanganian—Old Bolshevik; leader of the Armenian CP after 1917; prominent theoretician; founder and first editor of the principal theoretical organ *Pod Znamiia Marksizma* (Under the Banner of Marxism). Shot in 1936.

Yuri Piatakov—participated in revolutionary movement from 1904; prominent during Civil War; Chairman, first Soviet government in the Ukraine, 1918; held various posts between 1920 and 1936, last one being that of Vice-Chairman, People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Shot in 1937.

Karl Radek—participated in revolutionary movement from 1904; one of the principal leaders of the left wing of the German Social Democratic Party before World War I; after 1917, prominent in both the Russian and the German CP. Sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment in 1937, but not heard of since.

Nikolai Muralov—one of the oldest Bolsheviks; one of the leaders of the Moscow insurrection in November 1917; a hero of the Civil War. Shot in 1937.

Leonid Serebriakov—in revolutionary movement from the age of 14; first arrested at the age of 15; after 1917, member of the Moscow Soviet Presidium; Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1919–20; Secretary of All-Russian C. E. C. of Soviets; Commissar of Communications, 1922; held various posts until his execution in 1937.

Grigori Sokolnikov—member of the party from 1905; after October Revolution directed nationalization of banks; Commissar of Finance, 1922; Deputy Chairman, State Planning Commission, 1926; Ambassador to Great Britain, 1929; Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, 1934. Sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in 1937, not heard of since.

Alexei Rykov—in revolutionary movement from childhood; Commissar of Home Affairs in first Bolshevik government; successor to Lenin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (*i. e.*, Premier), 1924–30. Shot in 1938.

Nikolai Bukharin—one of the foremost theoreticians of the party, author of *The ABC of Communism;* head of the Comintern, 1926–29; co-author (with Radek) of the Soviet Constitution of 1936; Editor of *Pravda* and later of *Izvestia*. Shot in 1938.

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KHRUSHCHEV AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

. . . The last issue of your publication carried a most challenging and stimulating article by Andrew Haven, "The Time Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy," which gives a very interesting summing-up of past Soviet diplomacy and stresses the characteristic features of post-Stalinist behavior in the international sphere.

Moscow's current diplomatic line is to calm Western apprehension by suaveness while penetrating Asia and the Arab world by the use of appropriate propaganda weapons. Its objective, however, remains unchanged—the disintegration of the Western alliance. Mr. Haven's conclusions are fully corroborated by Khrushchev's speech at the opening session of the Communist Party Congress.

While noticeably soft in tone, the foreign policy set forth by Khrushchev is a dynamic one. His speech was confident, even triumphant. He is sure that the Western political and economic system will collapse. The main significance of his declarations, however, lies in the summons which he addresses to Communists and Socialists to bury their differences and cooperate. The aim is obvious: to pave the way for efforts to create "popular front" regimes which will usher in Communist revolution in legal guise.

The Stalinist policy of brute force was fraught with peril for the world. But the new Soviet policy of outward softness is no less dangerous, because it encourages neutralism in the free world. It is more imperative than ever that the democracies maintain their unity and combat the spurious Communist "popular front" tactics on the domestic front.

Paris, France **Andrew Perlaky**

[Mr. Perlaky was formerly Hungarian chargé d'affaires in Brussels.]

WHICH WAY TITO?

It might be rather late in the day to discuss the significance of the Soviet visit to Yugoslavia in May 1955, but it seems to me that even Richard Lowenthal's penetrating analysis (in issue 6, November–December 1955) omitted to take into account a fact of crucial importance. After Bulganin and Khrushchev had left Yugoslavia, some Western commentators were of the opinion that Tito made some real concessions to Moscow, when subscribing to the view that Peiping must be "accorded its rightful place in the United Nations" and that "the lawful rights of the Chinese People's Republic in relation to Taiwan (Formosa)" must be satisfied. They overlooked, however, that this had been the Titoist point of view right from the beginning and that no change of outlook—not to speak of a concession to Moscow—was implied here.

But there exists another criterion for judging whether Belgrade yielded to Moscow pressure in any important respect, and this is the German problem. Here Tito was only prepared to agree on generalities about the necessity of a solution of the German question "on a democratic basis and in accordance with the wishes and interests of the German people, as well as the interests of general security." Moscow certainly pressed Belgrade to agree on a declaration condemning Western German rearmament, and it would hardly have been surprising if the Titoists had followed a somewhat watered-down Moscow party line just on this issue. Yet the commentators of the Belgrade regime had consistently been in favor both of EDC and the Paris Agreements and the Bulganin-Tito statement brought nothing that would have forced them to eat their words. While recognizing Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh, Tito so far did not show any readiness to recognize the Pieck-Grotewohl regime.

All of this is not said to prove that Tito ever was or still is an absolutely reliable ally of the free world. But it seems to me to prove that Tito did not capitulate before Moscow on any essential point—and later events are only apt to confirm this impression.

London, England **J. W. Bruegel**

[Mr. Bruegel is a Czech expert on international law and a newspaper correspondent.]

Mr. Lowenthal replies: Mr. Bruegel is certainly right in stating that Tito's moral support for Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi-Minh, as expressed in last year's Belgrade declaration, was not new; that is why I did not discuss it. I am afraid he is less correct in assuming that there has been no change in Tito's attitude to the German problem, though that was not clear from the text of the declaration.

I do not agree that Yugoslav commentators were consistently favorable to the Paris agreements. They were consistently favorable to German rearmament as ending an untenable discrimination; before the Paris agreements were ratified, they showed some mild interest in the idea of a united, armed and neutral Germany without committing themselves. They then accepted both the Paris and Warsaw agreements as inevitable on "realist" grounds, and by the time of the Geneva conference of Foreign Ministers they came to support the Soviet view that a European security pact incorporating both German states was the best way to reduce tension and bring German unity nearer, and that free all-German elections were not a "realist" way to unity. In private, Yugoslav spokesmen now explain that they would regard general diplomatic recognition of the East German regime by uncommitted and Western states as justified, though they do not wish to take this step alone.

The fact is that in the last few months Yugoslav diplomacy has moved closer to the Soviet position, not indeed as the automatic result of any "surrender" implied in the Belgrade declaration, but for similar reasons, and to a similar extent, as some of the uncommitted nations of Asia have moved that way. The doctrinal

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changes and the disavowal of Stalin proclaimed at the Soviet CP Congress will no doubt further strengthen that tendency. But that is another story.

SOVIET AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM

Mr. Volin's article, "Report on the Agricultural Front" (Vol. IV, No. 6, November-December 1955), rightly points out that the crux of the Soviet agricultural problem lies in expanding food and fiber production to meet the imperative requirements of a rapidly growing population. It strikes this writer, however, who likewise has done rather extensive research in the field, that some of Mr. Volin's conclusions contain an element of wishful thinking.

With respect to the virgin lands project, Mr. Volin bases his highly pessimistic estimate on the contention that the principal causes for the failure of a similar experiment in the 1930's, which he says was conducted "largely in the same regions beyond the Volga and the Urals," still exist—in particular, the "marginal or submarginal" quality of most of the new acreage, severe climate, *etc.*

First of all, the present project is located in North and East Kazakhstan, an area not involved in the 1930's. This area embraces the greater part of the Asiatic portion of the Russian *chernozem* (black soil) belt; hence to write it off as mostly marginal or submarginal is stretching a point, though some undoubtedly is. Also, while it is true that a severe continental climate prevails, it must be borne in mind that the land resource pattern of today is immeasurably different from that of the 1930's by reason of mechanization, the development of shelterbelts, and other advances in scientific agriculture.

Mr. Volin, in the writer's opinion, also underestimates the prospects of success in the Soviet project to achieve a goal of 70 million acres planted to corn by 1960. He remarks that "the USSR has no corn belt similar to that of the United States"; yet he also notes that corn's position as the highest-yielding grain per acre in the USA is largely due to the introduction of hybrid seed and increased use of fertilizer. To be sure, these aids as well as others mentioned by Mr. Volin are presently lacking in the USSR, but they are bound to be introduced and developed, and the entire South European portion of the country, with some irrigation or even without it, can become good corn-growing territory.

Washington, D. C., USA. **Ivan M. Elchibegoff**

Mr. Volin replies: I cannot understand Mr. Elchibegoff's optimism. The severe drought and failure of crops in the eastern part of the USSR which is the locus of the "virgin lands" project, muted the optimism of the Soviet leadership in their own public utterances and even put Khrushchev, to some extent, on the defensive.

The virgin land project involves a shift to regions with unfavorable climatic conditions and consequently, of precarious agriculture. This is especially true of Kazakhstan, which was involved in a similar, though unsuccessful experiment in the early 1930's, when the acreage increased by a third between 1928 and 1931 only to drop in the following years. The shift is the reverse of soil conservation efforts in the United States, which aim at taking poorer land out of cultivation and putting it back under natural vegetation cover. The plowing up of marginal and sub-marginal land in a dry region, whether with the aid of tractors or without them, is anything but scientific agriculture.

The huge corn (maize) expansion program is also out of focus. That Soviet Russia has no corn belt corresponding to that of the United States was stated, among others, by the late Dr. C. F. Marbut, of the United States Department of Agriculture, who traveled in the USSR and did much to introduce Russian soil science to America. To be sure, corn is the highest yielding major grain in the United States, but only where natural conditions are favorable for its growth. Even hybrid seed has the most beneficial effect on yields only in the typical corn belt where the natural environment is most favorable, as was statistically demonstrated by Professor D. Gale Johnson in a paper delivered at the December 1955 meeting of the American Farm Economic Association. And surely the Soviet's present lack of hybrid seed and know-how, coupled with shortages of fertilizer and machinery, hardly warrants the huge crash program of corn expansion from Archangel to the Black Sea and from the Baltic to the Pacific.

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